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INTRODUCTION
The standard liability insurance policy 1 provides both litigation and

t B.A., 1980, Wilkes College; M.A., 1984, The Johns Hopkins University; J.D., 1983,
American University; Associate, Mudd, Harrison & Burch, Towson, Maryland.
1. This article will concentrate on cases interpreting the duty-to-defend provision in a
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liability protection for the insured. Each is an important benefit. The
insurer's duty to defend relieves the insured of the expense of defending a
suit and makes available the insurer's vast legal and investigative resources for the purpose of defeating the claim. The insurer's duty to
indemnify relieves the insured of the obligation to settle a claim or pay a
final judgment.
In Maryland, the duty to defend under the standard policy is determined by comparing the allegations in the claimant's pleadings to the
coverage provisions of the policy. 2 If the allegations describe an injury
which is within the scope of the insurer's duty to indemnify, then the
insurer has a duty to defend. 3 Moreover, if the allegations do not fall
within the policy's coverage but create a potential that the insurer will
have a duty to indemnify, then the insurer must defend. This is true even
if the insurer possesses independent knowledge that no duty to indemnify
actually exists. It is only when the allegations fall clearly outside the
scope of the coverage and do not raise a potentiality of coverage that the
insurer has no duty to defend. 4
In recent years, Maryland courts have expanded the insurer's defense obligation to a point where the insurer has a near-absolute duty to
defend whenever its insured is sued. This expansion is both appropriate
and justified. As the drafter of the policy, the insurer could have limited
Comprehensive General Liability (C.G.L.) policy, which will be referred to as the
standard liability policy. Reference to other duty-to-defend provisions will be made
to highlight the fundamental elements of the standard provision. The C.G.L. policy
provides:
The company will pay on behalf of the insured all sums which the insured
shall become legally obligated to pay as damages because of
A. bodily injury or
B. property damage
to which this insurance applies, caused by an occurrence, and the company shall have the right and duty to defend any suit against the insured
seeking damages on account of such bodily injury or property damage,
even if any of the allegations of the suit are groundless, false or fraudulent,
and may make such investigation and settlement of any claim or suit as it
deems expedient, but the company shall not be obligated to pay any claim
or judgment or to defend any suit after the applicable limit of the company's liability has been exhausted by payment of judgments or
settlements.
For a discussion of the C.G.L. policy, see Sharpe & Shaffer, The Parameters of An
Insurer's Duty to Defend, 19 FORUM 555 (1984).
2. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Pryseski, 292 Md. 187, 193-94, 438 A.2d 282,
285-86 (1981). This is known as the comparison test. See Travelers Indem. Co. v.
Dingwell, 414 A.2d 220, 226 (Me. 1980).
3. Brohawn v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 276 Md. 396, 407-08, 347 A.2d 842, 850 (1975).
4. See Mraz v. American Universal Ins. Co., 616 F. Supp. 1173, 1177 (D. Md. 1985)
(citing Minnick's, Inc. v. Reliance Ins. Co., 47 Md. App. 329, 333-34, 422 A.2d
1028, 1030 (1980)), rev'd sub nom. on other grounds, Mraz v. Canadian Universal
Ins. Co., 804 F.2d 1325 (4th Cir. 1986); GEICO v. Ropka, 74 Md. App. 249, 257,
536 A.2d 1214, 1218 (1987) ("It is generally true that an insurer has no duty to
defend a cause of action against an insured if that cause of action asserts liability on
the part of the insured that comes within an exclusion in the insurance policy."),
cert. denied, 312 Md. 601, 541 A.2d 964 (1988).
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its defense duty. Instead, the insurer bargained for the right to control
the litigation and settlement process. In exchange, it promised to defend
against groundless, false and fraudulent claims, and assumed the risk
that its defense duty would arise because of ambiguous, incomplete or
poorly drafted pleadings.
This article analyzes the nature, extent and the existence of the insurer's duty to defend in Maryland under the standard liability policy.
This article also attempts to clarify the concept of "potentiality of coverage" by an extended examination of the "exclusive pleading rule," "the
potentiality rule" and "the comparison test." 5 Special attention is given
throughout to Maryland case law, although reference to the approaches
taken by other jurisdictions are made for purposes of comparison. 6 In
addition, the law of other jurisdictions is considered regarding issues not
yet addressed by Maryland courts.
II.

THE INSURER'S DUTY TO DEFEND

There is no duty to defend on the part of an insurer at common
law. 7 The duty is contractual and is best understood in simple contract
terms. 8 The insured pays a premium to the insurer. In return, he receives, as consideration, the insurer's promises to defend and to indemnify him. 9 The insurer's basic responsibility under a standard liability
S. The main focus of this article is on issues that arise from the concept of "potentiality
of coverage." The insurer's duty to use reasonable care and good faith in defending
a claim is discussed only briefly, and its duties to investigate, to pay undisputed
claims, to settle claims within policy limits, and to indemnify are addressed only as
they relate to the duty to defend. Similarly, the coordination of other insurance
clauses, the duties and responsibilities running between concurrent insurers, and the
ethical problems faced by insurance defense counsel are only briefly mentioned.
6. The insurer's duty to defend has spawned extensive commentary. See, e.g., Cahoon,
Company's Duty to Defend-Recent Developments, 1961 INS. L.J. 151; Dohoney,
The Liability Insurer's Duty to Defend, 33 BAYLOR L. REv. 451 (1981); Garbett,
The Duty to Defend Clause in a Liability Insurance Policy: Should the Exclusive
Pleading Test be Replaced?, 36 U. MIAMI L. REv. 235 (1982); Comment, The Insurer's Duty to Defend Under a Liability Insurance Policy, 114 U. PA. L. REV. 734
(1966) [hereinafter Comment, The Insurer's Duty].
7. See Steyer v. Westvaco Corp., 450 F. Supp. 384, 389 (D. Md. 1978); All-Star Ins.
Corp. v. Steel Bar, Inc., 324 F. Supp. 160, 163 (N.D. Ind. 1971) (cited with approval
by Brohawn v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 276 Md. 396, 411-12, 347 A.2d 842, 852
(1975)); Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Rairigh, 59 Md. App. 305, 317, 475 A.2d 509,
514-15, cert. denied, 301 Md. 176, 482 A.2d 502 (1984).
8. Riviera Beach Volunteer Fire Co. v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 388 F. Supp. 1114,
1120 (D. Md. 1975) (duty to defend is a contractual assumption). One commentator, however, has observed that liability insurance has evolved from a simple contractual agreement to a complex undertaking and that "most problems in liability
insurance can no longer be viewed in a traditional contract analysis, but call for the
application of tort doctrines, statutory construction and considerations of public
policy." Comment, Liability Insurers and Third-Party Claimants: The Limits of
Duty, 48 U. CHI. L. REv. 125, 125 (1981).
9. Brohawn v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 276 Md. 396,409, 347 A.2d 842, 851 (1975). In
addition to paying a premium, the insured promises to notify the insurer of any
claims and to cooperate with the insurer's investigation and defense of any claim.
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policy "is to defeat or pay a claim within the policy's coverage." 10 Thus,
although the insurance is commonly known as liability insurance, it is in
reality litigation insurance as well. 11
The duty to defend, being a contractual obligation, exists only to the
extent that the policy requires the insurer to defend its insured. The
standard policy states that "the company shall have the right and duty to
defend any suit against the insured seeking damages on account of ...
bodily injury or property damage, even if any of the allegations of the
suit are groundless, false or fraudulent." 12 If a policy does not contain a
duty-to-defend provision, then there is no implied duty to defend. 13 Similarly, a policy that gives the insurer the right, but not the duty to defend,
may not create a duty to defend. 14
Although the standard policy contains a defense duty, some types of
policies do not. Excess policies, 15 for example, often provide liability
protection but no litigation protection. 16 Furthermore, some primary
policies, 17 such as directors' and officers' liability policies, may contain a
narrower duty to defend than is found in the standard policy. In such a
case, Maryland courts will not infer a broader duty. In Continental Casualty Co. v. Board of Education, 18 for example, the court of appeals observed that the provisions of the directors' and officers' liability policy
under review were "substantially different from the duty to defend clause

10.
11.
12.
13.

14.
15.

16.
17.
18.

/d.; see also infra notes 167-174 and accompanying text. The insurer's duties of
defense and indemnification involve obligations to investigate, negotiate and settle
claims. Brohawn, 276 Md. at 409, 347 A.2d at 851.
Burd v. Sussex Mut. Ins. Co., 56 N.J. 383, 389-90, 267 A.2d 7, 10 (1970).
See Brohawn, 276 Md. at 409-10, 347 A.2d at 851.
See supra note 1.
See Steyer v. Westvaco Corp., 450 F. Supp. 384, 389~90 (D. Md. 1978). In Steyer,
the court refused to recognize a duty to defend in a policy issued by the Home
Insurance Company because of a provision expressly disclaiming the duty. /d. at
394. The court, however, did not address whether an implied duty to defend could
exist where the policy did not contain an express disclaimer. But see Conanicut
Marine Servs., Inc. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 511 A.2d 967, 970 (R.I. 1986)
(implied duty to defend found to exist because policy provided liability insurance
and did not contain a provision negating duty to defend).
See Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Pacific. Indem. Co., 579 F. Supp. 140, 144 (W.O. Pa.
1984).
Excess insurance, also known as secondary insurance, "attaches only after a predetermined amount of primary coverage has been exhausted." Olympic Ins. Co. v.
Employers Surplus Lines Ins. Co., 126 Cal. App.3d 593, 597-98, 178 Cal. Rptr. 908,
910-11 (1982) (quoted with approval in United States Fire Ins. Co. v. Maryland
Casualty Co., 52 Md. App. 269, 271-72, 447 A.2d 896, 898 (1982)). The Olympic
court noted that "[i]t is not uncommon to have several layers of secondary insurance." /d. at 597-98, 178 Cal. Rptr. at 911.
See Steyer v. Westvaco Corp., 450 F. Supp. 384 (D. Md. 1978); see also supra note
13.
Primary insurance is insurance which, under the terms of the policy, "attaches immediately upon the happening of the occurrence that gives rise to liability."
Olympic, 126 Cal. App.3d at 597, 178 Cal. Rptr. at 910 (emphasis in original).
302 Md. 516, 489 A.2d 536 (1985).
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of a conventional liability policy." 19 The court held that the insurer's
defense obligation extended only to claims that fell actually within coverage because (1) the policy did not give exclusive control of the litigation
to the insurer, (2) it required the insured to retain its own counsel, and
(3) it obligated the insurer to compensate the insured for those litigation
expenses and attorney's fees incurred by the insured that were reasonably
related to covered claims. 20
As Continental suggests, the most notable feature of the insurer's
duty to defend under the standard policy is its application to claims that
fall outside the policy's coverage. The insurer's duties to defend and to
indemnify are distinct and independent obligations, related only in that
they both depend on the scope of coverage. 21 The insurer's obligation to
defend claims which are "groundless, false or fraudulent" 22 under the
standard policy exemplifies what has been called the "most significant
19. /d. at 530, 489 A.2d at 543. The duty-to-defend provision provided that:
(a) The Assureds and/or the School District shall select and retain legal
counsel to represent them in the defense and appeal of any claim, suit,
action or proceeding covered under this policy, but no fees, costs or expenses shall be incurred or settlements made, without the Insurer's consent, such consent not to be unreasonably witheld.
(b) The Insurer may at its option and upon request, advance on behalf of
an Assured, and/or the School District fees, costs and expenses which
have been incurred in connection with claims made against an Assured,
prior to disposition of such claims, provided always that, in the event it is
finally established the Insurer has no liability hereunder, each agrees to
repay to the Insurer, upon demand, all monies advanced on their
behalf....
/d. at 522, 489 A.2d at 539.
20. Continental argued that it did not have a duty to defend an entire multiple count
complaint against its insured because the policy did not contain any duty-to-defend
language, there was no obligation to defend groundless claims, and the insurer did
not have the right to select counsel and control the litigation. /d. at 529, 489 A.2d
at 542.
21. See Steyer v Westvaco Corp., 450 F. Supp. 384, 389 (D. Md. 1978). The duty to
defend arises from a comparison of the claimant's allegations to the policy's coverage; the duty to indemnify arises from a comparison of the ultimate findings of fact
in the underlying tort action to the policy's coverage. As the Steyer court noted, in
contrast to the duty to defend, "the question whether the insurer has a duty to pay a
final judgment against the insured turns on a comparison of the ultimate findings of
fact concerning the alleged occurrence with the policy coverage." /d. at 389; see
also Haines v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 428 F. Supp. 435, 439 (D. Md.
1977); Riviera Beach Volunteer Fire Co. v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 388 F. Supp.
1114, 1120 (D. Md. 1975).
.
22. In Burd v. Sussex Mut. Ins. Co., 56 N.J. 383, 267 A.2d 7 (1970), the court construed the standard duty-to-defend provision as follows:
The obligation to defend 'groundless, false or fraudulent' claims does not
mean that the carrier will defend claims which would be beyond the covenant to pay if the claimant prevailed. It means only that a carrier may not
refuse to defend a suit on the ground that the claim asserted against the
insured cannot possibly succeed because either in law or fact there is no
basis for a plaintiff's judgment.
/d. at 389, 267 A.2d at 10. In Oweiss v. Erie Ins. Co., 67 Md. App. 712, 509 A.2d
711 (1986), the court ruled that language in a duty-to-defend provision requiring the
insurer to defend the insured "even if the allegations are not true" was the
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difference" 23 between these two duties: the duty to defend is broader
than the duty to indemnify. 24 Under the standard policy, the insurer's
duty to defend imposes an obligation to defend the insured not only
against claims that actually fall within the policy's coverage but also
against any claim alleging facts that raise a potential duty to indemnify. 25

III.

THE INQUIRY INTO THE DUTY TO DEFEND

The issue of whether an insurer has a duty to defend a particular
claim made against its insured in Maryland has spawned extensive litigation and substantial confusion. 26 Most of the difficulties emanate from
the "exclusive pleading rule," the "potentiality rule" and the "comparison test." All three of these concepts flow directly from the language in
the standard duty-to-defend provision. 27 Language that varies from the
standard provision, however, can invalidate any, or all, ofthese standard
features. 28 A detailed analysis of the leading cases will highlight the in-

23.
24.

25.
26.

27.

28.

equivalent of the standard "groundless, false or fraudulent" language. /d. at 718,
509 A.2d at 714.
Sharpe & Shaffer, supra note 1, at 555-56.
This hornbook rule of law has been stated explicitly by only one court applying
Maryland law. See Western World Ins. Co. v. Harford Mut. Ins. Co., 600 F. Supp.
313, 321 (D. Md. 1984) ("the obligation to defend is broader than the obligation to
pay a final judgment"), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 784 F.2d 558 (4th Cir. 1986).
The rule, however, is implied in numerous decisions.
See Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Rairigh, 59 Md. App. 305, 320, 475 A.2d 509, 516,
cert. denied, 301 Md. 176, 482 A.2d 502 (1984).
In general terms, the inquiry into the duty to defend involves four separate questions: (1) is there a duty?; (2) what is the duty?; (3) what is the scope of the duty?;
and (4) does the claim give rise to the duty? The first three questions focus on the
insurance policy, the fourth on the claim. In St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v.
Pryseski, 292 Md. 187, 438 A.2d 282 (1981), the court saw only two inquires that
needed to be made when considering a duty-to-defend question. /d. at 197, 438
A.2d at 287. The court found it unecessary to discuss either the existence of a dutyto-defend provision or the type of defense duty because the St. Paul policy contained
the standard duty-to-defend provision. The Pryseski comparison test, in essence,
comprises steps three and four in the four-step inquiry.
The standard policy provision invokes both the exclusive pleading rule and the comparison test by obligating the insurer "to defend any suit against the insured seeking
damages on account of such bodily injury or property damage." See supra note 1.
The qualifying clause that the duty applies "even if any of the allegations of the suit
are groundless, false or fraudulent" buttresses this conclusion. See supra note 1; see
also Dohoney, supra note 6, at 452. The "potentiality rule" arises from language
that extends the insurer's obligation to defend against "groundless, false or fraudulent" suits, but gives the insurer the power to "make such investigation, negotiation
and settlement of any claims as it deems expedient." See supra note 1.
In Steyer v. Westvaco Corp., 450 F. Supp. 384 (D. Md. 1978), the court refused to
recognize a duty to defend in a policy issued by the Home Insurance Company
because of a provision expressly disclaiming the duty. The court noted that:
One significant consequence of this ruling that there is no duty to d~fend is
to make inapplicable the rule in a duty to defend situation that the liability
of the insurer to defend is determined by comparison of the allegations in
the complaint against the insured with the terms of the insurance policy.
/d. at 394; see also Continental Casualty Co. v. Board of Educ., 302 Md. 516, 489
A.2d 536 (1985) (exclusive pleading rule, potentiality rule and comparison test inva-
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tricacies and interplay of these rules.

A.

The Lee Cases and the Exclusive Pleading Rule

Maryland, like the majority of states, 29 follows the exclusive pleading rule 30 in determining whether an insurer has an obligation to defend
its insured against a claimant's claim. The exclusive pleading rule holds
that an insurer's defense obligation is determined solely by the allegations
against the insured in the claimant's pleadings. Under this rule, information extrinsic to the pleadings is not relevant in determining the insurer's
defense obligation. 31
The exclusive pleading rule has a long tradition. 32 Perhaps the case
most often cited for the proposition that the insurer's defense obligation
is to be determined solely by the allegations in the claimant's pleadings is
the Second Circuit's decision in Lee v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 33
which has been quoted with approval by Maryland courts. 34 In Lee, the
claimant, a customer in a pet store, sued the store for personal injuries
after he fell down an elevator shaft. Aetna, the store's insurer, discovered through its investigation that the claimant had fallen while trying to
use the elevator. Aetna refused to defend even though the policy contained a standard duty-to-defend provision, because coverage for liability
arising out of the use of an elevator was excluded. The complaint, however, alleged only that the claimant had fallen down the elevator shaft as
a result of the insured's negligence; it did not explicitly state that the
claimant was attempting to use the elevator when the accident
occurred. 35
Aetna argued that it had no duty to defend because the actual facts
of the tort action unequivocally showed that the claimant's injuries were
excluded from coverage. The insured argued that the insurer's duty to
defend rested on the claimant's allegations and that the insurer was not
allowed to look beyond the four comers of the complaint in order to

29.
30.

31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

lid because directors' and officers' liability policy does not contain a duty-to-defend
provision similar to the standard policy).
See Annotation, Allegations in Third Person's Action Against Insured as Determining
Liability Insurer's Duty to Defend, 50 A.L.R.2o 458 (1956).
The majority rule has been called several different names. Compare Garbett, supra
note 6 ("exclusive pleading test") with Dohoney, supra note 6 ("complaint allegation rule"). The exclusive pleading rule is used in this article because it appears to
be the most accurate description, especially in light of Maryland Rules 1-202(r) and
2-302, which define a pleading as a complaint, an answer, a counterclaim, a crossclaim, or a third-party complaint. See Mo. R. 1-202(r), 2-302. The concept that an
insurer's duty to defend may be determined only by the allegations in the claimant's
pleadings is also more properly categorized as a rule than a test.
See Western World Ins. Co. v. Harford Mut. Ins. Co., 784 F.2d 558, 562 (4th Cir.
1986).
See Cahoon, supra note 6, at 151.
178 F.2d 750 (2d Cir. 1949).
See, e.g., Brohawn v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 276 Md. 396, 408, 347 A.2d 842, 850
(1975).
Lee, 178 F.2d at 753.
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determine its defense obligation. 36 The Second Circuit agreed with the
insured, holding that the insurer's promise to defend groundless, false or
fraudulent suits meant:
[T]hat the insurer will defend the suit, if the injured party states
a claim, which, qua claim, is for an injury 'covered' by the policy; it is the claim which determines the insurer's duty to defend; and it is irrelevant that the insurer may get information
from the insured, or from anyone else, which indicates, or even
demonstrates, that the injury is not in fact 'covered.' 37
The holding in Lee, 38 according to one commentator, "firmly established" the exclusive pleading rule in American insurance law. 39
Maryland has recognized the exclusive pleading rule. One court has
even called it a black letter rule of Maryland insurance law, 40 and exceptions to or deviations from the rule have been rejected repeatedly. 41 In
Ohio Casualty Insurance Co. v. Lee, 42 for example, an employee of the
insured, sued the manufacturers of an underground tank that had exploded and injured him. The manufacturers then filed third-party claims
for indemnity and contribution against the insured and Lee, who was a
director, stockholder and president of the insured. The third-party complaints alleged that Lee had negligently installed the underground storage tank, but they did not allege in what capacity Lee had acted when he
installed the tanks. Under the policy, Lee was covered only if he acted as
a director or stockholder. 43
Ohio Casualty denied coverage because its investigation revealed
36. Id. at 751-52.
37. Id. at 751. The converse of this statement is not necessarily true. If the pleadings
do not allege coverage but the insurer has facts that show coverage, then the insurer
is generally obligated to defend. See infra text accompanying notes 257-275.
38. The complaint raised a· potentiality of coverage because there was a possibility that
the claimant had not been using the elevator when he fell down the shaft. If the
complaint had expressly alleged that the plaintiff was "using" the elevator when he
fell, then the insurer would not have had a duty to defend the insured. The facts
established at trial showed that the plaintiff was indeed "using" the elevator when
he fell down the shaft, and consequently Aetna had no duty to indemnify even
though it had a duty to defend. Lee, 178 F.2d at 751-52.
39. Garbett, supra note 6, at 239.
40. Maryland Casualty Co. v. Armco, Inc., 643 F. Supp. 430,434 (D. Md. 1986), aff'd,
822 F.2d 1348 (4th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 703 (1988).
41. See, e.g., Western World Ins. Co. v. Harford Mut. Ins. Co., 784 F.2d 558, 562 (4th
Cir. 1986) (court specifically rejected the position that "an insurer can also look to
the actual facts surrounding an event to determine whether or not coverage exists,
and consequently to discern whether the insured has the duty to defend").
42. 62 Md. App. 176, 488 A.2d 988, cert. denied, 303 Md. 471, 494 A.2d 939 (1985).
43. Id. at 181, 488 A.2d at 990. For a discussion of the nature, scope and validity of
"co-employee" exclusions in an insurance policy, see Larimore v. American Ins.
Co., 69 Md. App. 631, 519 A.2d 743 (1987), rev'd, 314 Md. 617, 552 A.2d 889
(1989). See also Riviera Beach Volunteer Fire Co. v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 388
F. Supp. 1114 (D. Md. 1975); Bevans v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 356 F.2d 577 (4th
Cir. 1966).
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that the only possible capacity in which Lee could have acted when he
installed the tanks was as the insured's president. The court of special
appeals held that Ohio Casualty had an obligation to defend Lee even
when it appeared from extrinsic evidence that Lee was excluded from
coverage. 44 According to the court, Ohio Casualty's contractual obligation to defend rested exclusively on the claimant's pleadings, and extrinsic evidence could not be used to negate that duty. 45
Although neither of the Lee courts discussed the rationale behind
the exclusive pleading rule, both suggest that the language of the standard duty-to-defend clause provides that the insurer must determine its
duty on the basis of the allegations in the claimant's pleadings. 46 The
44. The court observed:
In the case sub judice, Ohio Casualty's belief as to the capacity in which
Lee acted will not relieve it of its duty to defend Lee. Nor can Ohio Casualty gain solace from the fact that there does not appear to be any basis for
a claim based on a capacity other than president. It undertook to defend
its insured against suits alleging bodily injury and seeking damages even if
the allegations of the suit are groundless, false or fraudulent.
Ohio Casualty, 62 Md. App. at 189-90, 488 A.2d at 995 (emphasis added) (footnote
omitted). The claimants' pleadings raised a potential that Ohio Casualty would
have a duty to indemnify Lee because the fact finder could have determined that Lee
acted as a director or stockholder when he installed the tanks. See infra text accompanying notes 52-84.
45. Ohio Casualty, 62 Md. App. at 187-90, 488 A.2d at 994-95. The court of special
appeals noted that "evidence concerning Lee's duties would be admissible and utilized by the trier of fact to determine the capacity in which he acted." Jd. at 188
n.l6, 488 A.2d at 994 n.l6. The court then concluded that:
[T]he trier of fact would have to determine if Lee were acting as a director,
as a stockholder, or as an employee performing the non-delegable duty of
his employer, or if he was acting solely in the capacity of president of Auto
Clean, therefore, as an employee. If it were to find the former, Lee would
be covered under the policy of insurance. Conversely, if it were to find the
latter, Lee would not be covered. In short, there is a 'potentiality' of
coverage.
ld. at 187-89, 488 A.2d at 994. The court's statement that Lee would have been
covered under the policy had he been acting as an. employee performing a nondelegable duty is incorrect. The co-employee exclusion applies to all employees act.
ing within the scope of their employment. Including an employee who is ,performing a non-delegable duty defeats the very purpose of the co-employee exclusion. It
is obvious that the Ohio Casualty court confuses the difference between insurance
coverage and tort liability. Lee, as either a mere employee or an employee performing a non-delegable duty, is excluded from coverage. As an employee performing a
non-delegable duty, however, Lee would enjoy tort immunity under the Maryland
Workers' Compensation Act. Mo. ANN. CODE art. 101, §58 (1985); see also Athas
v. Hill, 300 Md. 133, 476 A.2d 710 (1984). The potentiality for indemnification in
Ohio Casualty arose because the complaint was silent as to whether Lee was functioning in his capacity as an employee (i.e., as president) or as a director or stockholder when he installed the tanks. It did not arise because the complaint was silent
as to whether Lee was functioning as a mere employee or as an employee performing a non-delegable duty.
46. See supra note 27 and accompanying text; see also All-Star Ins. Corp. v. Steel Bar,
Inc., 324 F. Supp. 160, 163 (N.D. Ind. 1971) ("If the parties had so intended, the
insurance policy could have been drafted so as to predicate the duty of the insurer to
defend upon a determination that the facts of the case actually were within the
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rule is also justified on several other grounds. Above all else, it is easy,
efficient and objective. 47 Abrogation of the exclusive pleading rule, as
one commentator has phrased it, "would require the parties to the insurance contract to exercise clairvoyance in order to determine their respective rights and liabilities, since there would be no objective ... basissuch as reference to the [claimant's] pleadings-for determining these
rights. " 48
In Maryland, the duty to defend can arise out of any type of original
or amended pleading. 49 While it is obvious that an original or amended
complaint, counter-claim, cross-claim or third-party claim can give rise
to a duty to defend, it is less obvious, but still technically possible, that an
opposing party's original or amended answer can also give rise to the
duty if the answer actually constitues a counterclaim. 50 When an original pleading does not raise a duty to defend but a subsequent pleading
does, the insurer's defense duty does not arise unless, and until, the insurer is notified of the subsequent pleading and asked to assume the
defense. 5 1

B.

Brohawn and the Potentiality Rule

·Perhaps the most important and most misunderstood aspect of an
insurer's duty to defend its insured is the concept of "potentiality of coverage." The court of special appeals has recognized the confusion that
surrounds the concept of "potentiality of coverage" by noting that it is
only a "somewhat distinct standard." 52 The duty to defend all claims

47.

48.
49.

50.
51.
52.

coverage of the policy. Since the policy makes the duty to defend rest upon the
allegations of the injured party, the Court has no authority to look beyond the allegations to the actual facts."); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Newsom, 352 S.W.2d 888, 893
(Tex. Civ. App. 1981)("We pose the question: Why is the duty of the insurer to
defend determinative of the allegations in the third party's complaint? We answer
our own question with the very logical conclusion that the contract so provides ....
That is the coverage paid for by the insured.").
Dohoney states that the exclusive pleading rule "is clearly a mechanical one and,
therefore, should present little difficulty for courts attempting to determine the liability insurer's obligation to defend under most ... policies." Dohoney, supra note
6, at 453. Garbett, while questioning the validity of the rule in some contexts, admits that it affords "efficiency, ease of application, and objectivity." Garbett, supra
note 6, at 261.
Dohoney, supra note 6, at 455.
Maryland Rules 1-202(r) and 2-302(a) define a pleading as a complaint, an answer, a
counterclaim, a cross-claim or a third-party complaint. MD. R. 1-202(r), 2-302(a).
Under Maryland Rule 2-341 amendments of pleadings are freely allowed. MD. R.
2-341.
Maryland Rule 2-323(g) provides that "[w]hen a party has mistakenly designated
... a counterclaim as a defense, the court shall treat the pleading as if there had
been a proper designation, if justice so requires." MD. R. 2-323(g).
See Oweiss v. Erie Ins. Exch. Co., 67 Md. App. 712,718-19,509 A.2d 711,714-15
(1986); see also Washington v. Federal Kemper Ins. Co., 60 Md. App. 288, 482
A.2d 503 (1984), cert. denied, 302 Md. 289, 487 A.2d 292 (1985).
Travelers Indem. Co. v. Insurance Co. ofN. Am., 69 Md. App. 664,671, 519 A.2d
760, 764 (1987). This confusion possibly arises because the term "coverage" has
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which potentially come within policy coverage was fully articulated in
Brohawn v. Transamerica Insurance Company. 53 There, the coverage issue arose out of an altercation at a nursing home when Mary Brohawn
tried to remove her grandmother from the home. 54 Several employees of
the home questioned the appropriateness of the removal and attempted
to prevent it. An argument ensued, and Brohawn allegedly assaulted two
of the employees. 55 Brohawn was arrested and charged with kidnapping
and assault. She pleaded guilty to the assault charge and the kidnapping
charge was dismissed. Several months later, the two employees filed a
civil suit against Brohawn for assault. 56 Subsequently, the suit was
amended by addition of a count which alleged that the employees' injuries were caused by Brohawn's negligence.
At the time of the incident at the nursing home, Brohawn was insured by Transamerica Insurance Company under a homeowner's policy
that contained a variation of the standard duty-to-defend provision. 57

53.
54.
55.
56.

57.

several different meanings. In All-Star Ins. Corp. v. Steel Bar, Inc., 324 F. Supp.
160 (N.D. Ind. 1971), the court stated:
Whether an insurance policy 'covers' a particular incident depends initially upon whether the contract is in force (e.g., whether premiums have
been paid), whether the conditions precedent have been met (e.g., whether
the insured notified the insurer of the accident), and whether the incident
falls within a specific exclusion in the policy (e.g., where the driver of an
automobile was not legally authorized to drive a car). If there is no 'coverage' in the sense used here, the Court never reaches the problems of determining the duty to defend or duty to pay under the contract since the
contract does not even apply in such a situation....
If it is determined that the contract does apply, the Court must then
look to 'coverage' in a different sense to determine the duties of the insurer
under the policy. There are two types of 'coverage' which are involved
here. There is the question of whether the risk insured against encompasses the facts of the accident as alleged. There is also the question of
whether in fact the occurrence was of the type insured against. In this
latter sense, 'coverage' is synonymous with liability to pay.
ld. at 162 (emphasis in original).
276 Md. 396, 409-10, 347 A.2d 842, 850-51 (1975). The potentiality rule was first
articulated in United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. National Paving & Contracting
Co., 228 Md. 40, 54, 178 A.2d 872, 879 (1962).
See Transamerica Ins. Co. v. Brohawn, 23 Md. App. 186, 187-91, 326 A.2d 758,
760-62 (1974), rev'd, 276 Md. 396, 347 A.2d 842 (1975).
ld. at 188-89, 326 A.2d at 760-61. The facts of the case suggest that the court used
the term "assault" to refer to both an assault and a battery. The term is used in this
context in this article.
The complaint sought compensatory and punitive damages and alleged that
"Brohawn ... did 'with force and arms, willfully and maliciously and without any
just cause or provocation' assault them, resulting in 'serious, painful and permanent
injuries.'" Brohawn, 276 Md. at 399, 347 A.2d at 846 (quoting complaint).
The duty-to-defend provision was contained in the "Comprehensive Personal Liability" section of the policy, under which the insurer agreed:
To pay on behalf of the Insured all sums which the Insured shall become
legally obligated to pay as damages because of bodily injury or property
damage, and the Company shall defend any suit against the Insured alleging such bodily injury or property damage and seeking damages which are
payable under the terms of this Section, even if any of the allegations of the
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The policy excluded coverage for "any act committed by or at the direction of the Insured with intent to cause injury to person or property." 58
Transamerica refused to defend Brohawn and requested a declaratory
judgment that it had no obligation either to defend or to indemnify
Brohawn in the underlying tort action.
The trial court denied Transamerica's request for a declaratory
judgment, held that the indemnity issue would be decided by the jury's
verdict on the issues in the underlying tort suit and ordered Transamerica to defend Brohawn. 59 Transamerica appealed, arguing that it had no
duty to defend Brohawn because her guilty plea in the criminal trial had
established that any injuries received by the plaintiffs in the tort suit were
the result of intentional acts by Brohawn. 60 In addition, Transamerica
argued that even if it had an obligation to defend Brohawn, it should be
relieved of that duty because of conflict of interest and possible
prejudice. 61
The court of appeals first addressed the obligations imposed by the
standard duty-to-defend provision:
The obligation of an insurer to defend its insured under a contract provision such as here involved is determined by the allegations in the tort actions. If the plaintiffs in the tort suits
allege a claim covered by the policy, the insurer has a duty to
defend. . . . Even if a tort plaintiff does not allege facts which

58.
59.

60.
61.

suit are groundless, false or fraudulent; but the Company may make such
investigation and settlement of any claim or suit as it deems expedient.
/d. at 400, 347 A.2d at 846 (emphasis in original). Note the difference between the
duty-to-defend language in the Brohawn policy (any suit against the insured alleging
such bodily injury) and the language in the C.G.L. policy (any suit against the insured seeking damages). See supra note 1. Dohoney argues that the difference does
not affect the validity of the exclusive pleading rule. Dohoney, supra note 6, at 45455.
Brohawn, 276 Md. at 400, 347 A.2d at 846.
/d. at 401-02, 347 A.2d at 846-47. The Brohawn court's holding that the issue of
whether Brohawn acted negligently or intentionally would be decided in the underlying tort action implicitly recognizes the use of special jury questions. See Mo. R.
2-522(c). For an example of special jury questions in a tort action involving alternative theories of negligence and intentional torts, see Allstate Ins. Co. v. Atwood, 71
Md. App. 107, 523 A.2d 1066, cert. granted, 310 Md. 274, 528 A.2d 1286 (1987).
Insurance defense counsel, however, should be cautious about using special jury
questions in a conflict-of-interest situation. If the insured has consented to the insurer's selection of independent counsel, then the independent counsel's use of special jury questions may violate the duties of loyalty he owes to the insured. See
generally Williams & Jernberg, Conflicts of Interest in Insurance Defense Litigation:
Common Sense in Changing Times, 31 FED'N INS. COUNS. Q. 111 (1981). If the
defense counsel thinks that the special jury questions are in the best interests of the
insured, he should fully explain the nature, purpose and consequences-both in tort
liability and insurance coverage contexts--of the questions to the insured. He
should then obtain the insured's express written permission to use the questions and
notify the insurer of his inteption to use them.
Brohawn, 276 Md. at 403, 347 A.2d at 847.
Id. at 410-15, 347 A.2d at 852-54. For a discussion of the conflict of interest between the insurer and the insured, see infra text accompanying notes 175-205.
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clearly bring the claim within or without the policy coverage,
the insurer still must defend if there is a potentiality that· the
claim could be covered by the policy. 62
According to the court, the insurer's obligation was to defend any suit
stating a claim within the policy even when "'the claim asserted against
the insured cannot possibly succeed because either in law or fact there is
no basis for a plaintiff's judgment.' " 63 Even though Brohawn had
pleaded guilty to the criminal assault charge, that plea was not binding in
the civil action, and the fact finder in the civil action could have decided
that Brohawn acted negligently, not intentionally. Thus, a potentiality of
coverage existed.
The court also specifically rejected Transamerica's argument that
performance of its obligation to defend was made more difficult because
of the evidence that Brohawn's acts were intentional. 64 Similarly, the
court found that the insurer was not relieved of its defense obligation
because of the conflict of interest between it and the insured. 65 Noting
that unexpected difficulty does not discharge a promisor from his duty to
perform, the court concluded that "(t]he insurer has unconditionally
promised to defend the insured and therefore has assumed the risk that
performance might be more difficult under some circumstances than
others." 66 In the court's view, the insurer's promise to defend its insured
"unconditionally" was made in exchange for the absolute right to control
the defense. Requiring the insurer to defend comported with the expectations of the insured that the insurer would "employ its vast legal and
investigative resources to defeat the action for the mutual benefit of both
the insurer and the insured. " 67
Brohawn and its progeny make clear that any potentiality of cover62. Brohawn, 216 Md. at 407-08, 347 A.2d at 850 (emphasis in original) (citations
omitted).
63. /d. at 408-09, 347 A.2d at 850 (quoting Burd v. Sussex Mut. Ins. Co., 56 N.J. 383,
267 A.2d 7 (1970)).
64. Transamerica also sought to stay the underlying tort action until the declaratory
judgment action had been resolved. The court of appeals rejected Transamerica's
position, holding that the trial court had correctly denied Transamerica's request
for declaratory relief on the grounds that the "ultimate issue" of whether Brohawn
had acted negligently or intentionally would be fully decided in another pending
action. /d. at 405, 347 A.2d at 849; see also infra notes 100-103 and accompanying
text.
65. Brohawn, 216 Md. at 414-15, 347 A.2d at 854. The court held that when such a
conflict arises, the insurer must give the insured a choice of accepting the insurer's
independent counsel or retaining his own counsel. If the insured retains his own
attorney, then the insurer is obligated to reimburse the insured for reasonable litigation expenses and attorney's fees. /d.; see also infra text accompanying notes 175205.
66. Brohawn, 216 Md. at 410, 347 A.2d at 851.
67. /d. While Maryland courts have not embraced the doctrine of reasonable expectations, they have considered the insured's expectations in determining the intent of
the parties to an insurance contract. See infra notes 264-267 and accompanying
text. For a general discussion of the doctrine of reasonable expectations, see 1A R.
LONG & M. RHODES, THE LAW OF LIABILITY INSURANCE§ 5.09 (1987).
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age, no matter how slight, gives rise to a duty to defend. The potentiality
rule, in this regard, is perhaps better labeled the "possibility rule," 68 and
courts have characterized it as such. 69 The defense obligation extends
even to those claims filed in bad faith for the sole purpose of raising a
potentiality of coverage. For example, a claimant may add a negligence
count to a pleading in order to create a Brohawn potentiality for the purpose of bringing the insurer into the case, even if there is little, if any,
basis for the negligence count. Similarly, an insured's attorney may ask
the claimant's attorney to amend a pleading to include a negligence
count. 70 While some courts have relieved an insurer of its duty to defend bad-faith potentiality claims, the better reasoned rule is that the insurer remains obligated to defend. 71 The promise to defend groundless,
false or fraudulent claims is clearly broad enough to include defending
the insured against allegations made for the sole purpose of invoking the
insurer's duty to defend. 72
68. In Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Hendrix, 199 F.2d 53 (4th Cir. 1952), the court
characterized the rule in the following manner:
[I]n our opinion the policy should be so construed as to require the insurer
to defend where it is apparent from the pleading that there is a reasonable
possibility that the insured may be able, under the allegations of the complaint, to prove that his injuries were caused by some act or omission covered by the terms of the contract.
/d. at 56 (emphasis added).
69. See, e.g., Western World Ins. Co. v. Harford Mut. Ins. Co., 784 F.2d 558, 562 (4th
Cir. 1986) (applying Maryland law) (complaint left open "the possibility that [the
insured] acted negligently rather than intentionally" (emphasis added)).
70. See Browne, The Demise of the Declaratory Judgment Action as a Device for Testing
the Insurer's Duty to Defend: A Postscript, 24 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 18, 27 (1975); see
also Oweiss v. Erie Insurance Exchange Co., 67 Md. App. 712, 509 A.2d 711 (1986).
In Oweiss, the insurer argued that the claimant and the insured had contrived to
include a negligence count in an amended complaint, and that as a consequence the
company was relieved of its duty to defend. The court rejected the insurer's position
for lack of evidence, but the decision implicitly left open the possibility that, in a
proper case, either collusion between an insured and the claimant or the claimant's
bad-faith inclusion of a count raising a potentiality of coverage would relieve an
insurer of its duty to defend.
71. See A. WINDT, INSURANCE CLAIMS AND DISPUTES: REPRESENTATION OF INSURANCE COMPANIES AND INSUREDS § 4.04, at 139-40 {2d ed. 1988). But see State
Farm Ins. Co. v. Trezza, 121 Misc. 2d 997, 1001, 469 N.Y.S.2d 1008, 1012 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1983) (if insurer believes a complaint "has been drafted in bad faith and
designed solely to bring an insurer into a case," it can institute a declaratory judgment action against the claimant "to test the factual allegations of the complaint in
the underlying [tort] action").
72. In such a situation the insurer would have recourse against the claimant and his
attorney under Maryland Rule 1-341, which provides:
In any civil action, if the court finds that the conduct of any party in
maintaining or defending any proceeding was in bad faith or without substantial justification the court may require the offending party or the attorney advising the conduct or both of them to pay to the adverse party the
costs of the proceeding and the reasonable expenses, including reasonable
attorney's fees, incurred by the adverse party in opposing it.
Mo. R. 1-341. Moreover, if the insurer has offered a defense to the insured but the
insured has colluded with the claimant to create a potentiality issue where the facts
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There are several ways for claims to fall potentially within the coverage of a policy. In a Brohawn-type complaint, there is one count for
negligence and one count for an intentional tort. The former is within
coverage; the latter is not. The insurer is obligated to defend because the
fact finder could decide that the insured's actions were negligent, not intentional, thus keeping the claim within coverage. The Brohawn potentiality rule, however, is applicable not only to a multiple-count pleading
that alleges negligence and an intentional tort as alternative theories of
recovery, but also to any pleading containing allegations that, if proved,
will establish liability within the policy's coverage. 73
A potentiality of coverage can also arise because of ambiguous allegations. In Southern Maryland Agricultural Association v. Bituminous
Casualty Corp., 74 for example, the allegations in the complaint did not
state with precision whether a malicious prosecution had occurred during the applicable policy dates. The court held that the incomplete allegations in the complaint raised a potentiality of coverage and required
the insurer to defend. 75 Similarly, in Harford Mutual Insurance v. Jacobson,76 a potentiality of coverage arose because of vague allegations. 77
Harford had attempted to withdraw its defense because its investigation
showed that the lead poisoning injuries alleged in the complaint fell
outside of the applicable dates of the policy period. 78 In holding that

73.

74.
75.

76.
77.

78.

do not justify it, the insurer may be able to assert a breach of the insured's duty to
cooperate. See Newman v. Stocker, 161 Md. 552, 157 A. 761 (1932); Anderson &
Ireland Co. v. Maryland Casualty Co., 123 Md. 67, 90 A. 780 (1914) (discussion of
insured's collusion with claimant as possible breach of insured's duty to cooperate
with the insurer).
See, e.g., Minnick's, Inc. v. Reliance Ins. Co., 47 Md. App. 329, 333-34, 422 A.2d
1028, 1030 (1980) (claim for loss of consortium in multiple-count complaint gives
rise to a potentiality of coverage); see also St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v.
Pryseski, 292 Md. 187, 438 A.2d 282 (1981) (potentiality of coverage was raised
where question whether insurer had duty to indemnify was for the factfinder). For
an extended discussion of Pryseski, see infra text accompanying notes 85-118.
539 F. Supp. 1295 (D. Md. 1982).
/d. at 1304. The court concluded that "[t]he question whether the 'offense' was
actually committed during the policy period, so as to indicate coverage under the
first Pryseski inquiry, is so 'intertwined' with the second inquiry that it must be
resolved in the underlying suit." /d. (emphasis in original).
73 Md. App. 670, 536 A.2d 120, cert. denied, 312 Md. 601, 541 A.2d 964 (1988).
Keisha Carter and her mother sued Jacobson, who was acting as the personal representative of the estate of Israel Shapiro, for personal injuries Keisha received from
eating lead paint chips in a rental house owned by Shapiro's estate. The complaint
alleged "that at or about 1981 Keisha Carter consumed lead paint chips and subsequently became ill." /d. at 675, 536 A.2d at 122. The complaint also alleged that
Keisha Carter "has required extensive and continuous medical care, attention and
treatment ... [and] ... is still receiving treatment." /d. at 675, 536 A.2d at 122-23.
At the time the Carter complaint was filed in November 1983, Shapiro's estate was
insured by Harford Mutual against claims arising out of the ownership of the rental
house. The Harford policy took effect on June 3, 1983. Harford's investigation of
the claim discovered that Keisha Carter was afflicted with lead poisoning as early as
September 8, 1982. /d. at 674, 536 A.2d at 122.
"Bodily injury" was defined in the policy as "bodily injury, sickness or disease sus-
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Harford had a duty to defend its insured, the court of special appeals first
noted that "while Harford may believe that the incidents giving rise to
liability preceded the date the policy became effective ... this belief will
not relieve it of its duty to defend its insured." 7 9 The court then decided
that the vagueness of such phrases in the complaint as "at or about,"
"subsequently became ill," "has required ... continuous medical care,
attention and treatment" and "is still receiving treatment," coupled with
allegations that notice of a lead paint housing code violation had been
issued during the policy period, created a potentiality that the occurrence
happened within the policy period and gave rise to a duty to defend. 80
A clear and unmistakable implication of Brohawn and its progeny is
that the duty to defend exists unless it can be conclusively shown as a
matter of law that there is no possible factual or legal basis on which the
insurer may eventually be found liable under its duty to indemnify. 81 In
analyzing a pleading, then, three maxims should guide the inquiry into
whether the allegations create a potentiality that the insurer will have a
duty to indemnify. First, if there is a reasonable possibility that the allegations raise a claim within the scope of the insurer's duty to indemnify,
the insurer must defend. Second, the insured's right to a defense should
be foreclosed only if the pleadings indicate that "such a result is inescapably necessary." 82 Finally, if there is any doubt as to "whether or not the
allegations ... against the insured state a cause of action within the coverage of a liability policy sufficient to compel the insurer to defend the
action, such doubt will be resolved in [the] insured's favor." 83 The gen-

79.
80.

81.
82.

83.

tained by any person which occurs during the policy period." /d. at 680, 536 A.2d at
125 (emphasis in original).
/d. at 678, 536 A.2d at 124.
/d. at 675-79, 536 A.2d at 122-24 (emphasis added). The court, however, found that
Harford had no duty to indemnify Jacobson because evidence adduced during the
declaratory judgment action showed that although Keisha Carter's injuries had persisted into the period of coverage under the Harford policy, "her injuries first manifested themselves prior to coverage when she was diagnosed in 1982 by the
Baltimore City Health Department as having lead poisoning." /d. at 684, 536 A.2d
at 127. In the court's view, the date of an "occurrence" for the purposes of determining coverage under the standard liability policy was the date when the harm was
first discovered. /d. at 684, 536 A.2d at 127. Thus, Carter's claim "occurred"
before the policy became effective and, accordingly, was beyond the risk undertaken
by the insurer.
Pennsylvania Aluminum, Inc. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur., 61 A.D.2d 1119, 402
N.Y.S.2d 877 (1978) (New York rule).
See Donnelly v. Transportation Ins. Co., 589 F.2d 761, 765 (4th Cir. 1978) ("[W]ith
the great latitude with which pleadings are construed today, and the great latitude
of amendment, an insured's right to a defense should not be foreclosed unless such a
result is inescapably necessary.").
United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. National Paving & Contracting Co., 228 Md.
40, 54, 178 A.2d 872, 879 (1962) (quoting Annotation, Allegations in Third Person's
Action Against Insured as Determining Liability Insurer's Duty to Defend, 50
A.L.R.2o 458 (1956)) (emphasis added by the court). This is, essentially, the application of the doctrine of contra proferentem to the comparison test. See Babcock &
Wilcox Co. v. Parsons Corp., 430 F.2d 531, 536 (8th Cir. 1970) (The comparison
test developed when pleading was required to be more specific; under notice plead-
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eral, overriding rule for an insurer to follow is, as one commentator has
phrased it, "when in doubt, defend." 84
C

Pryseski and the Comparison Test

Although the Brohawn court established that an insurer has a duty
to defend a claim that comes potentially within the policy's coverage, it
did not set out any express guidelines for determining when a potentiality
of coverage actually exists. In St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co. v.
Pryseski, 85 the Court of Appeals of Maryland again had the opportunity
to consider the potentiality issue, and this time it delineated a practical
approach to the problem.
The insurance coverage dispute in Pryseski arose out of a personal
injury suit brought by Mr. and Mrs. Grantland against Charles Pryseski
and Sun Life Insurance Company of America. The plaintiffs alleged that
Pryseski had made sexual advances toward Mrs. Grantland while he was
at her home collecting a monthly insurance premium for his employer,
Sun Life. 86 St. Paul insured Sun Life under a comprehensive liability
policy that provided personal injury coverage87 and contained the standard duty-to-defend provision. An endorsement to the policy extended
coverage to employees acting within the scope of their duties. The indemnity provision provided coverage for damages because of bodily injury caused by an occurrence. The term "occurrence" was not defined in
the policy itself, only in the policy jacket. 88
St. Paul entered a defense for Sun Life but refused to defend
Pryseski. 89 St. Paul eventually settled the Grantland tort ac-

84.
85.
86.

87.
88.

89.

ing, "[t]he courts have generally placed the burden of uncertainty as to the policy's
coverage on the insurer.").
1A R. LONG & M. RHODES, supra note 67, § 5.01; see also infra notes 232-256 and
accompanying text.
292 Md. 187, 438 A.2d 282 (1981).
The complaint contained three counts. The first, for intentional infliction of emotional distress, alleged that Pryseski, during the course of and while acting in the
scope of his employment with Sun Life, made sexual advances toward Mrs. Grantland. The second count, for assault and battery, asserted that Pryseski, during the
course of and while in the scope of his employment with Sun Life, assaulted and
battered Mrs. Grantland. The third count was a joint claim by Mr. and Mrs.
Grantland for loss of consortium. Pryseski's duties at Sun Life included the collecting of insurance premiums. /d. at 190-91, 438 A.2d at 284.
Personal injury liability insurance provides coverage for such offenses as false arrest,
malicious prosecution, defamation, and wrongful entry or eviction.
Pryseski, 292 Md. at 189, 438 A.2d at 283. In its appellant's brief, however, St. Paul
indicated that the term "occurrence" was defined in a policy jacket that for some
reason had not been attached to Pryseski's petition for a declaratory judgment, nor
had it been produced by St. Paul with the rest of the policy during discovery or
introduced by either Pryseski or St. Paul into evidence at trial. Because the jacket
was not part of the record in the case, the court of appeals remanded and instructed
that the definition of "occurrence" in the jacket could be considered by the trial
court. /d. at 199-200, 438 A.2d at 288-89.
St. Paul refused to defend Pryseski on two grounds: (1) Pryseski was not acting
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tion, 90 but Pryseski filed suit for a declaratory judgment that St. Paul had
a duty to defend him because of a "potentiality" of coverage, and sought
recovery of the legal expenses he incurred as a result of St. Paul's breach
of its duty. 91 The trial court ruled that St. Paul had a duty to defend
Pryseski. St. Paul appealed, and the court of special appeals affirmed on
the basis of Brohawn. 92 The court of appeals granted certiorari. 93
In considering the coverage issue, the court of appeals established a
comparison test:
In determining whether a liability insurer has a duty to provide
its insured with a defense in a tort suit, two types of questions
ordinarily must be answered: (1) what is the coverage and what
are the defenses under the terms and requirements of the insurance policy? (2) do the allegations in the tort action potentially
bring the tort claim within the policy's coverage? The first
question focuses upon the language and requirements of the
policy, and the second question focuses upon the allegations of
the tort suit. At times these two questions involve separate and
distinct matters, and at other times they are intertwined, perhaps involving an identical issue. 94
The court then qualified its comparison test by placing the Brohawn
potentiality rule within the framework of the test:
The 'rule' ... that the insurer has a duty to defend if the allegations of the tort suit raise a 'potentiality' that coverage exists, is
generally applicable only to the second question set forth above.
It may, however, be applicable to an issue raised under the first
question set forth above if that issue must also be resolved in
the underlying tort suit. 9 s
After establishing the comparison test, the court of appeals attempted to apply it to the facts of the dispute between Pryseski and St.
Paul. Under the first inquiry, the court found that the policy obligated
St. Paul to indemnify Sun Life for all sums that Sun Life was legally
bound to pay as damages caused by an "occurrence" committed by an
employee acting within the scope of his employment. Owing to procedural oversight, however, the trial court had not considered the definition of occurrence given in the policy jacket. 96 Therefore, the case was
remanded for further consideration and the court never reached the sec-

90.
91.

92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

within the scope of his employment; and (2) the policy excluded coverage for "willful acts in violation of [a] penal statute or ordinance." /d. at 191, 438 A.2d at 284.
St. Paul obtained a release from the Grantlands for both Pryseski and Sun Life. /d.
/d.
The court of special appeals' opinion was unreported. See St. Paul Fire & Marine
Ins. Co. v. Pryseski, 47 Md. App. 753 (decided Oct. 27, 1980).
289 Md. 741 (cert. granted Feb. 10, 1981).
Pryseski, 292 Md. at 193-94, 438 A.2d at 285.
/d.
See supra note 88.
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ond prong of the test. 97
Although the court of appeals in Pryseski never completed its application of the comparison test, it noted that the complaint raised a potentiality of coverage when it alleged that Pryseski was acting within the
scope of his employment when he sexually assaulted Mrs. Grantland.9 8
This conclusion, however, would not have ended the inquiry. St. Paul
would have had a duty to defend only if the Grantlands' claims were of
the type that fell within the definition of occurrence. If the allegations
against Pryseski did not actually or potentially amount to an occurrence
as defined in the insurance policy, St. Paul would not have been obligated
to defend Pryseski. 99
The Pryseski comparison test seeks to establish a reliable and
mechanical method for determining both actual and potential coverage.
It also seeks to differentiate between coverage issues that are "separate
and distinct" from the issues in the tort suit and those that are "intertwined" with the issues in the tort suit. Intertwined coverage questions
are those that cannot be tried in a separate declaratory action if the underlying tort action is pending because they involve an ultimate issue at
trial. 100 A factual issue is intertwined with the underlying tort action if it
is "squarely presented for resolution in the tort action ... ," 101 is material
to establishing the tort liability of the insured, and would establish the
insurer's liability under its duty to indemnify. 102 A factual issue is not
material if it is collateral to the issues in the underlying tort action but
would nevertheless bear upon the insurer's liability under its duty to
indemnify. 103
97. Pryseski, 292 Md. at 199-200 & n.l, 438 A.2d at 288-89 & n.l.
98. Id. at 196, 438 A.2d at 287 ("In light of the allegations of the tort suit concerning
scope of employment and ratification, the court of special appeals in this case correctly held that the tort suit determined the scope of employment issue.").
99. See Edward Winkler & Son, Inc. v. Ohio Casualty Ins. Co., 51 Md. App. 190, 441
A.2d 1129 (1982).
100. Whether Brohawn acted intentionally or negligently, or whether Pryseski was acting within the scope of his employment, are prime examples of this type of coverage
question.
101. Maryland Auto. Ins. Fund v. Sun Cab Co., 305 Md. 807, 810, 506 A.2d 641, 643
(1986); see also Pope v. Sun Cab Co., 62 Md. App. 218, 225, 488 A.2d 1009, 1012
(1984) (the Brohawn court's concept of "ultimate issues" includes "those issues
raised by a [party] which, if resolved in his favor, will provide him with an absolute
defense to the pending suit"), aff'd sub nom. Maryland Auto Ins. Fund v. Sun Cab
Co., 305 Md. 807, 506 A.2d 641 (1986).
102. Compare Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Rairigh, 59 Md. App. 305, 317, 475 A.2d 509,
514-15 (issue must be material to tort action), cert. denied, 301 Md. 176, 482 A.2d
502 (1984) with Travelers lndem. Co. v. Insurance Co. ofN. Am., 69 Md. App. 664,
671, 519 A.2d 760, 763 (1987) (issue must be central to tort action).
103. For example, the question whether a driver of an automobile is using it with the
permission of the owner is collateral to the dirver's tort liability but would have had
a bearing on the insurer's duty to indemnify. In most cases, a factual question that
is collateral to the issues in the underlying tort action does not create a conflict of
interest over the conduct of the defense, and the insurer would not have to offer the
insured his Brohawn choice of counsel. See infra notes 181-182 and accompanying
text. There is even authority that an insurer can move beyond the four comers of
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Unfortunately, the Pryseski court's statement that the first and second prongs of the test may be intertwined or even involve the identical
issue has created abundant confusion. The court's qualification that the
potentiality rule is generally applicable only to the second part of the
comparison test, but may, under some circumstances, be applicable to
the first part, has only compounded the problem.
The Pryseski comparison test is little more than a recognition that
before a court can address whether there is a "potentiality of coverage,"
it must first ascertain the scope of "coverage" under the policy's language.104 Under the first step, the court tries to determine "what sorts of
claims are covered under the policy" 105 by applying the principles of construction 106 to the policy's coverage grants, definitions and exclusions. If
the policy is unambiguous, the court determines its scope as a matter of
law. 107 If the policy is ambiguous, the court may consider extrinsic evidence in an attempt to resolve the ambiguity. 108 If the extrinsic evidence
is inconclusive, the policy is construed against the insurer. 109

104.

105.
106.

107.
108.
109.

the claimant's pleadings to consider the actual, rather than the alleged, facts in determining whether it has a duty to defend. See Rairigh, 59 App. at 320..21, 475 A.2d
at 516-17; see also notes 257-275 and accompanying text.
The first step is to consider the definitions of the key terms in the coverage grant in
order to ascertain the breadth of the insurer's duty to indemnify. The key terms in
the standard duty-to-defend provision are "damages," "property damage," "bodily
injury," "caused by" and "occurrence." See Sharpe & Shaffer, supra note 1, at 55761. Usually, each of these terms is defined in the policy, and Maryland courts have
considered many of the standard definitions. The exclusions are then considered to
determine how the policy narrows the scope of its coverage. Both coverage grants
and coverage exclusions are interpreted in the same manner. Maryland, unlike
other jurisdictions, does not read exclusions more narrowly than coverage grants.
See Northern Assurance Co. of Am. v. EDP Floors, Inc., 311 Md. 217,227, 533
A.2d 682, 687 ( 1987). Exclusions are independent of each other and are read separately against the coverage grant. See Century I Joint Venture v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 63 Md. App. 545, 559, 493 A.2d 370, 377-78, cert. denied, 304
Md. 297, 498 A.2d 1183 (1985).
Southern Md. Agric. Ass'n v. Bituminous Casualty Corp., 539 F. Supp. 1295 (D.
Md. 1982).
Construction of an insurance policy is governed by "a few well-established principles." Pacific Indem. Co. v. Interstate Fire & Casualty Co., 302 Md. 383, 388, 488
A.2d 486, 488 (1985). One principle is to apply the contract's terms unless they
violate a statute, a regulation, or public policy. Mutual Fire, Marine & Inland Ins.
Co. v. Vollmer, 306 Md. 243, 250, 508 A.2d 130, 133 (1986). A second principle is
to construe the instrument as a whole to determine the intention of the parties to the
insurance contract. Pacific Indem., 302 Md. at 388, 488 A.2d at 488; see also
Aragona v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 281 Md. 371, 375, 378 A.2d 1346, 1348
(1977); Federal Ins. Co. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 275 Md. 460, 473, 341 A.2d 399, 407
(1975). Finally, "the character of the contract, its purpose, and the facts and circumstances of the parties at the time of execution" should be examined. Pacific
Indem., 302 Md. at 388, 488 A.2d at 488; see also Allstate Ins. Co. v. Humphrey,
246 Md. 492, 496, 229 A.2d 70, 72 (1967).
Pacific Indem., 302 Md. at 389, 488 A.2d at 489; Aragona, 281 Md. at 375, 378
A.2d at 1348.
See Pryseski, 292 Md. at 194, 438 A.2d at 288; Pacific /ndem., 302 Md. at 389, 488
A.2d at 489.
See Southern Md. Agric. Ass'n v. Bituminous Casualty Corp., 539 F. Supp. 1295,
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Once the scope of the coverage is determined, the court moves to the
second step to decide if the allegations in the claimant's pleadings fall
actually or potentially within the scope of the policy's coverage. This is
done by comparing the allegations in the complaint to the scope of coverage to determine if the complaint alleges a claim that is the type of claim
covered under the policy. If the court cannot resolve the question because the insurer's duty to indemnify depends on a factual issue that will
be resolved in the underlying tort suit (such as whether Brohawn acted
intentionally or negligently, or whether Pryseski was acting within the
scope of his employment), the court applies the Brohawn potentiality rule
and requires the insurer to defend. The insurer is then obligated to defend the suit until such time, if ever, that the only claims remaining are
ones outside the policy coverage. 110 Accordingly, the duty to defend is a
continuing obligation that springs into being when a claim comes actually or potentially within the policy's coverage and ceases only when
facts show that all potentiality of coverage has been eliminated. 111 Even
then, an insurer that has begun a defense may have to complete it if its
withdrawal would prejudice the insured. 112
It is perhaps doubtful whether the two parts of the comparison test
can be intertwined, much less whether they involve the identical issue.
Conceptually, the test always involves two separate inquiries, even if the
court decides to frame the inquires into one question. 113 The Pryseski
court's statement that the first and second inquiries of the comparison
test may be intertwined or involve the identical issue, then, merely reflects the fact that the court cannot determine on the basis of the pleadings whether the insurer has a duty to indemnify where factual issues
must be resolved in the underlying tort action. Viewing the two parts as
intertwined confuses the test for determining the insurer's duty to defend
with the test for determining the insurer's liability under its duty to in-

110.
111.
112.
113.

1299 (D. Md. 1982); Pryseski, 292 Md. at 194, 438 A.2d at 288; Truck Ins. Exch. v.
Marks Rentals, Inc., 288 Md. 428, 435, 418 A.2d 1187, 1191 (1980). Construing
the policy against the insurer and in favor of the insured does not automatically
result in coverage; all it does is resolve the ambiguity in favor of the insured. The
court must still move to the second inquiry to determine if the allegations fall actually or potentially within the coverage as construed.
Brohawn v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 276 Md. 396, 407-09, 347 A.2d 842, 850 (1975);
see also Steyer v. Westvaco Corp., 450 F. Supp. 384 (D. Md. 1984).
lA R. LONG & M. RHODES, supra note 67, § 5.01.
See generally id. A prudent insurer generally will not withdraw unilaterally from a
defense but will file a declaratory judgment action to have a court declare that the
defense duty has ceased.
For example, in Edward Winkler & Son v. Ohio Casualty Ins. Co, 51 Md. App. 190,
441 A.2d 1129 (1982), the court of special appeals observed that where determination of liability required both interpretation of the policy term "accident" and an
analysis of the tort action to see if it could potentially be regarded as an accident,
the two issues were "intertwined." /d. at 194,441 A.2d at 1131-32. Nevertheless,
the court determined the definition of "accident" before finding that the allegations
against the insured did not describe an "accident" within the meaning of the policy.
Id. at 195-96, 441 A.2d at 1132.
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demnify. 114 The scope of the insurer's duty to indemnify (what the policy covers), however, can be determined in the first prong of the
comparison test. Once the scope of the insurer's duty to indemnify is
ascertained, the allegations of the claimant's pleadings can then be analyzed to see if they fall within the policy's coverage.
The court of appeals' qualification in Pryseski that the potentiality
rule may be applicable to the first prong of the comparison test has compounded the confusion over the concept of "potentiality of coverage."
Consequently, inventive attorneys have tried to extend an insurer's liability beyond the scope of the policy's coverage by applying the potentiality
test to the court's interpretation of the policy itself. 115 In Northern Assurance Co. of America v. EDP Floors, Inc., 116 however, the court of appeals specifically rejected the application of the potentiality rule to the
first prong of the comparison test. The court stated that applying the
potentiality rule to the question of the scope of the insurer's duty to indemnify "would in effect create a canon of insurance contract interpretation that gives every benefit of the doubt to the insured, in contravention
of [the] many holdings that the unambiguous language in an insurance
contract is to be afforded its ordinary and accepted meaning." 117
The Pryseski comparison test, then, is best seen as a two step process
in which the court first determines the scope of the coverage and then
determines whether the pleadings set forth a claim that falls within that
scope. The first step focuses on the policy and involves the rules of construction. The second step focuses on the allegations in the claimant's
pleadings and may involve the application of the potentiality rule. The
test is not whether the policy can be construed to raise a potential duty to
defend, but whether the allegations raise a potential duty to indemnify.
The distinction is significant, but too often insureds and insurers try to
convert the potentiality rule into a rule of contract construction. 118

114. For a more detailed analysis of the interplay between the comparison test and an
intertwined coverage question, see Southern Md. Agric. Ass'n v. Bituminous Casualty Corp., 539 F. Supp. 1295 (D. Md. 1982).
ll5. See, e.g., Pederson v. Republic Ins. Co., 72 Md. App. 661, 532 A.2d 183 (1987). In
· Pederson, the policyholder argued that because the scope of the coverage of their
homeowner's policy was unclear, "there was, at least, a potentiality of coverage."
/d. at 665, 532 A.2d at 185 (emphasis in original).
116. 311 Md. 217, 533 A.2d 682 (1987).
117. /d. at 226, 533 A.2d at 686.
118. It is apparent that in practice, an insurer is often uncertain about the scope of its
duty to indemnify, and defends not because it believes that the allegations may give
rise to a duty to defend but because it fears that its policy could be interpreted to
broaden the scope of its duty to indemnify.
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THE CONSEQUENCES OF AN INSURER'S WRONGFUL
REFUSAL TO DEFEND

Liability for Contract Damages

An insurer that breaches its duty to defend 119 is liable for the contract damages incurred by the insured. 12° Contract damages are those
that arise naturally from the breach and that were reasonably within the
contemplation of the parties at the time they entered into the contract. 121
They usually consist of legal expenses and fees incurred by the insured in
defending the underlying tort action, or in bringing or defending a declaratory judgment action 122 to determine the coverage issue. 123
Under the Maryland Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act, either
the insurer or the insured may have the court determine any question of
coverage under a policy. 124 A declaratory judgment action is an appro119. It is axiomatic that if "the insurer's refusal to defend was not wrongful, it is not
liable for attorneys' fees." Northern Assurance, 311 Md. at 232, 533 A.2d at 690.
120. The right to recover for breach of a duty to defend applies to the named insured and
to "any person who is within the policy definition of an insured against whom a
claim alleging a loss within the policy coverage has been filed." Bankers & Shippers
Ins. Co. v. Electro Enter., Inc., 287 Md. 641, 649, 415 A.2d 278, 283 (1980). The
right does not extend to all successful parties in the declaratory judgment action,
only to successful insureds. Id. at 649-50, 415 A.2d at 283.
121. Pennsylvania Threshermen & Farmers' Mut. Casualty Ins. Co. v. Messenger, 181
Md. 295, 300-01, 29 A.2d 653, 656 (1943). Punitive damages would not be allowed.
See H. & R. Block, Inc. v. Testerman, 275 Md. 36, 44-46, 338 A.2d 48, 53 (1974)
(punitive damages cannot be awarded in pure breach of contract actions but are
recoverable in torts arising out of a contract if actual malice is shown).
122. See Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Rairigh, 59 Md. App. 305, 475 A.2d 509, cert.
denied, 301 Md. 176, 482 A.2d 502 (1984) (successful insured entitled to costs and
expenses of appeal from declaratory judgment action). Compare Cohen v. American Home Assurance Co., 255 Md. 334, 350-63, 258 A.2d 225, 234-39 (1969) (expenses incurred in bringing declaratory judgment action) with Brohawn v.
Transamerica Ins. Co., 276 Md. 396, 409-10, 347 A.2d 842, 851 (1975) (expenses
incurred in defending declaratory judgment action awarded to insured).
123. American Home Assurance Co. v. Osbourn, 47 Md. App. 73, 84, 422 A.2d 8, 14-15
(1980), cert. denied, 289 Md. 739 (1981). Attorney's fees are ordinarily not awarded
in a declaratory judgment action. Maryland Auto Ins. Fund v. Sparks, 42 Md.
App. 382, 395, 400 A.2d 26 (1979). Awarding an insured attorney's fees and litigation costs when an insurer unjustifiably refuses to defend is an exception to this
general rule. See Osbourn, 47 Md. App. at 84, 422 A.2d at 14. This exception is
"well established." See Continental Casualty Co. v. Board of Educ., 302 Md. 516,
538, 489 A.2d 536, 547 (1985).
124. World Ins. Co. v. Perry, 210 Md. 449, 452, 124 A.2d 259, 260 (1956). The act
provides that:
[A]ny person interested under a ... written contract, or other writing
constituting a contract, or whose rights, status, or other legal relations are
affected by a ... contract ... may have determined any question of construction or validity arising under the ... contract ... and obtain a declaration of rights, status, or other legal relations under it.
MD. Crs. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN.§ 3-406 (1984). A declaratory judgment may
be sought "notwithstanding the availability of concurrent common law, equitable,
or extra-ordinary forms of relief." Century I Joint Venture v. United States Fidelity
& Guar. Co., 63 Md. App. 545, 560-61, 493 A.2d 370, 378, cert. denied, 304 Md.
297, 484 A.2d 1183 (1985).
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priate and useful means of resolving policy coverage questions when they
are "independent and separable" from the claims asserted in the underlying tort action. 125 Early resolution of these coverage questions may
avoid unnecessary expense and delay to both insurer and insured, 126 and
an insurer would be wise to pursue declaratory relief in most cases where
it is available.
"Independent and separable" coverage questions might include the
enforceability of the policy itself (e.g., whether the insured has paid his
premiums); technical policy defenses (e.g., whether the insured has
breached or fulfilled his duties of notification and cooperation); construction questions (e.g., the definition of the term "occurrence" in Pryseski);
and factual questions involving issues that are not material to the underlying tort action (e.g., whether the driver of a vehicle was driving an
automobile covered by the insurance policy). 127 These questions have
nothing to do with the factual issues in the underlying tort action and
can be tried in a separate declaratory action before, or after the underlying tort action. 128 Moreover, the insurer, in order to save defense costs,
can move to stay the underlying tort action pending a resolution of the
declaratory judgment action. A trial court has the discretion to refuse to
grant a declaratory judgment, 129 and should do so when the declaratory
judgment action seeks to resolve "intertwined" coverage questions. 130
The award of attorney's fees and litigation expenses incurred in a
declaratory judgment action is justified on two grounds. 131 First, the in125. Brohawn, 276 Md. at 405, 347 A.2d at 849.
126. /d.
127. If the insurer believes that it has a legitimate policy defense, it should nevertheless
defend the insured under a reservation of rights, while at the same time filing a
declaratory judgment action to determine whether the policy defense is valid. See
infra notes 249-256 and accompanying text.
128. As a precaution, if the insurer believes that its policy does not cover the type of
claim asserted in the claimant's pleadings, it should defend under a reservation of
rights and seek declaratory relief defining the scope of its obligations. See infra
notes 249-256 and accompanying text.
129. The declaratory judgment process should not be used if a declaration of rights
would not serve a useful purpose or terminate the existing controversy. Mo. CTS. &
Juo. PRoc. CODE ANN. § 3-409(a) (1984); accord Century I Joint Venture v.
United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 63 Md. App. 545, 561, 493 A.2d 370, 379, cert.
denied, 304 Md. 297, 484 A.2d 1183 (1985); see also Brohawn, 276 Md. at 406, 347
A.2d at 849 ("If the granting of the [declaratory] judgment would unduly inconvenience or burden the parties, or allow one party to wrest control of the litigation from
another and cause a confusing alteration of the burden of proof, the court should
refuse to grant the [declaratory] relief.... ").
130. Brohawn, 276 Md. at 405-06, 347 A.2d at 849; see also Haynie v. Gold Bond Bldg.
Prods., 306 Md. 644, 652, 511 A.2d 40, 44 (1986) (The rule that a court should
decline to decide an issue that is pending in another action is neither jurisdictional
nor absolute. It is discretionary, and "[a] declaratory judgment may be rendered to
decide an issue, even though the issue is presented in another pending case between
the parties in 'very unusual and compelling circumstances.'") (quoting A.S. Abell
Co. v. Sweeney, 274 Md. 715, 721, 337 A.2d 77, 81 (1975)); Harpy v. Nationwide
Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 76 Md. App. 474, 545 A.2d 718 (1988).
131. See Cohen v. American Home Assurance Co., 255 Md. 334, 350-63, 258 A.2d 225,
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surer is said to have "authorized" the expenditure of the fees by its failure to defend. Second, the fees are considered part of the damages
sustained by the insured as a result of the insurer's breach of its contractual duty to defend. 132 The insured has the burden of proving the expenses and fees "with the certainty and under the standards ordinarily
applicable for proof of contractual damages." 133
A judgment entered against or an amount paid pursuant to a settlement entered into by an insured following his insurer's breach of its duty
to defend is not necessarily part of the contract damages. The duty to
defend and the duty to indemnify are independent and distinct obligations. While the duty to defend arises because of alleged facts, the duty
to indemnify arises because of actual facts. It is not uncommon for an
insurer to have a duty to defend but no duty to indemnify. A judgment
entered against an insured determines his tort liability but does not necessarily determine the insurer's liability under its duty to indemnify.
Similarly, a settlement between the claimant and the insured extinguishes
the insured's tort liability but does not establish insurance coverage. 134
There is no causal nexus between the insurer's breach and the resulting
judgment. 135 Therefore, an insurer that has breached its duty to defend
can ordinarily deny it has an obligation to pay a final judgment.
Under some circumstances, however, the insurer may be collaterally
estopped from relitigating an issue that has been decided in the underlying tort action. 136 Collateral estoppel precludes relitigation whenever the

132.
133.

134.

135.
136.

234-39 (1969). The court of appeals has admitted that the recovery of litigation
expenses and attorneys' fees incurred by an insured in bringing or defending a declaratory judgment action is based on an "unrefined" legal theory. See Continental
Casualty Co. v. Board of Educ., 302 Md. 516, 537, 489 A.2d 536, 547 (1985).
American Home Assurance Co. v. Osbourn, 47 Md. App. 73, 84, 422 A.2d 8, 14-15
(1980), cert. denied, 289 Md. 739 (1981).
Bankers & Shippers Ins. Co. v. Electro Enter. Inc., 287 Md. 641, 661, 415 A.2d 278,
289 (1980); Travelers Indem. Co. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 69 Md. App. 664,
681, 519 A.2d 760, 768 (1987) (quoting Bankers & Shippers, 287 Md. at 661, 415
A.2d at 289); see also Continental, 302 Md. at 538, 489 A.2d at 547.
In McCarthy v. United Serv. Auto. Ass'n, 24 Misc. 2d 79, 204 N.Y.S.2d 420 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1960), the court distinguished between tort liability and insurance
coverage:
The fact that [the insurer] may have had an obligation to defend ... or
that he violated such obligation may render him liable in damages ... had
[the insured] expended money to defend himself. It does not by itself
render (the insurer] liable for the judgment. There is a distinction between
liability and coverage.
/d. at 80, 204 N.Y.S.2d at 421; accord Hargis v. Maryland Am. Gen. Ins. Co., 567
S.W.2d 923, 928 (Tex. Ct. App. 1978) (cited by Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v Rairigh,
59 Md. App. 305, 322,475 A.2d 509, 517, cert. denied, 301 Md. 176,482 A.2d 502
(1984)).
See Comment, The Insurer's Duty, supra note 6, at 740.
/d. In Farmers Ins. Co. v. Vagnozzi, 138 Ariz. 443, 675 P.2d 703 (1983) (cited by
Rairigh, 59 Md. App. at 322, 475 A.2d at 517), the court admitted that there is
"interplay and confusion of the doctrine of collateral estoppel and the insurer's duty
under the insurance policy to defend an insured." ld. at 445, 675 P.2d at 705. In
Maryland, there is additional confusion about the difference between the doctrines
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issues in the two suits are identical. 137 In general, the insurer "is bound
under the doctrine of collateral estoppel by the facts determined in the
trial of such action which are essential to the judgment of tort liability."138 Thus, the insurer would not be able to relitigate the tort liability
of the insured, nor could it contest the amount of the judgment against
the insured or the legal and factual basis for that judgment. 139 Moreover,
if the underlying tort action determined an "intertwined" coverage issue,
such as whether an insured acted intentionally or negligently, or whether
an employee of the insured was acting within the scope of his employment, then the insurer would be precluded from relitigating that issue. 140
If, however, the insurer's duty to indemnify rested on a factual issue that
was not material to the tort liability in the underlying tort action, then
the insurer would be able to relitigate that issue, even if the issue had
been decided by the fact finder in the underlying tort action. 141

137.

138.
139.
140.
141.

of equitable estoppel and collateral estoppel. In Rairigh, for instance, the court
lumps a discussion of the two doctrines under the heading of "estoppel," even
though they are separate and independent. Rairigh, 59 Md. App. at 315, 475 A.2d
at 514.
Collateral estoppel provides that only those issues which were "actually litigated" in
the prior suit are conclusive against the same parties litigating the same issues in a
subsequent proceeding. MacKall v. Zayre Corp., 293 Md. 221, 228, 443 A.2d 98,
101-02 (1982). The application of collateral estoppel between the insurer and the
insured is predicated upon an assumed identity of interest of the parties to the insurance policy in opposing the claimant's tort action. Rairigh, 59 Md. App. at 316, 475
A.2d at 514. One commentator contends, however, that collateral estoppel is not
applicable, and that the insurer would always be able to relitigate the coverage issue,
even if the underlying tort action had decided what he terms "common issues" (i.e.,
"intertwined" factual issues). Morris, Conflicts of Interest in Defending Under Liability Insurance Policies: A Proposed Solution, 3 UTAH L. REV. 457, 490-91 (1981).
The Maryland courts have taken a contrary position, holding that an insurer is
precluded from relitigating factual issues that were material to the underlying tort
action and that were actually decided in the underlying tort action. See Brohawn v.
Transamerica Ins. Co., 276 Md. 396,409-10, 347 A.2d 842, 851 (1975); Allstate Ins.
Co. v. Atwood, 71 Md. App. 107, 523 A.2d 1066, cert. granted, 310 Md. 274, 528
A.2d 1286 (1987). The Maryland approach is logical when the factual issue in the
underlying tort action is identical to the factual issue that determines coverage, and
the justification for this preclusion is even stronger where the insurer has intervened
in the underlying tort action. For a discussion of the insurer's right of intervention,
see Atwood, 71 Md. App. at 113, 523 A.2d at 1069.
Vagnozzi, 138 Ariz. at 445, 675 P.2d at 705. See generally A. WINDT, supra note 71,
§ 6.23, at 339 (Insurer is bound "by the resolution of all issues that necessarily had
to be resolved in adjudicating the underlying [tort] action.").
See Comment, The Insurer's Duty, supra note 6, at 741.
See Brohawn, 276 Md. at 409-10, 347 A.2d at 851-52; Atwood, 71 Md. App. at 112,
523 A.2d at 1069.
See, e.g., Vagnozzi, 138 Ariz. at 445, 675 P.2d at 705 ("A party will not be precluded
from litigating policy coverage in a subsequent proceeding if the question of coverage turns on facts which are nonessential to the judgment of tort liability."). In
Hargis v. Maryland Am. Gen. Ins. Co., 567 S.W.2d 923 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978)
(cited by Rairigh, 59 Md. App. at 322, 475 A.2d at 517), the court stated that collateral estoppel " 'extends only to points directly involved in the action decided, and
not to any matter which was only incidentally cognizable, or which came collaterally in question.' This is true, even though the matter coming collaterally in question may have been judicially passed on." Id. at 928 (quoting Berger v. Kirby, 135
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In approaching the issue of whether an insurer is precluded from
relitigating an issue that was adjudicated in, but was not material to, the
underlying tort action, the court must consider competing interests. On
one side, there is concern for "judicial economy, finality of decisions, and
avoidance of conflicting judgments." 142 There is also the desire to "forestall round robin litigation of issues" among the claimant, the insured
and the insurer. 143 On the other side is the insurer's due process right to
have its day in court. This fundamental right "may override any considerations of efficiency or expediency served by the minimization of litigation."144 Thus, "[e]lementary fairness demands a proceeding in which
the differences between the insurer and insured may be tried." 145
Although an insurer that breaches its duty to defend relinquishes
control of the litigation and settlement process, 146 it is nevertheless obligated only for any amounts the insured paid in settling a claim that is
actually, not just potentially, covered by the policy. 147 The settlement,
however, must be reasonable and must have been made in good faith and
with due care. 148 The basis for holding the insurer liable for the insured's
reasonable, good faith settlement of a covered claim rests on the terms of
the standard policy that obligate the insurer to pay on behalf of the insured any amount which the insured has become legally obligated to
pay. 149 The settlement is seen as part of the insured's damages.

142.
143.
144.
145.

146.

147.
148.
149.

S.W. 1122 (Tex. Civ. App. 1911), aff'd, 153 S.W. 1130 (Tex. 1913)); see also Glens
Falls Ins. Co. v. American Oil Co., 254 Md. 120, 254 A.2d 658 (1969) (issue of
whether the insured intentionally ran his automobile into the claimant was not
presented for resolution in the underlying tort action because the claimant sued only
on a negligence theory). For an explanation of Glens Falls, see Brohawn, 276 Md. at
414 n.3, 347 A.2d at 853-54 n.3.
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Atwood, 71 Md. App. 107, 523 A.2d 1066, cert. granted, 310
Md. 274, 528 A.2d 1286 (1987).
Steyer v. Westvaco Corp., 450 F. Supp. 384, 397 (D. Md. 1978).
Glens Falls, 254 Md. at 134, 254 A.2d at 666.
Rairigh, 59 Md. App. at 321, 475 A.2d at 517. There is even authority for the
proposition that the doctrine of collateral estoppel is suspended whenever there exists a conflict of interest over the defense of the underlying tort action. See Hargis,
567 S.W.2d at 928; cf RESTATEMENT (SECOND) JUDGMENTS, §§ 57(2), 58 (1982).
Maryland evidently does not follow this proposition, because it requires the insurer
to defend despite the conflict of interest and also allows the insurer to intervene in
the underlying tort action to protect its interests. See infra notes 175-205 and accompanying text.
See United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. National Paving & Contracting Co., 228
Md. 40, 48, 178 A.2d 872, 875 (1962) ("It is settled law that where there is a denial
of liability and a refusal to defend on the part of the insurer ... the insured is no
longer bound by a provision of a policy prohibiting settlement of claims without the
insurer's consent, or a provision making the insurer's liability dependent on the obtaining of a judgment against the insured."). See generally Comment, The Insurer's
Duty, supra note 6, at 743.
National Paving, 228 Md. at 48, 178 A.2d at 875; Oweiss v. Erie Ins. Exch. Co., 67
Md. App. 712, 720, 509 A.2d 711, 715-16 (1986).
National Paving, 228 Md. at 48, 178 A.2d at 875.
See Theodore v. Zurich Gen. Accident & Liab. Ins. Co., 364 P.2d 51 (Alaska 1961).
In Theodore, the court noted that insurer's liability for settlement of a claim within
coverage follows from its failure to defend because "that which is paid in a prudent
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The settlement of a claim that is outside the policy's coverage, in
contrast, is not a natural consequence of the insurer's failure to defend
and will not obligate the insurer to indemnify the insured, even if the
settlement was reasonable and made in good faith. 150 When an insured
settles both covered and non-covered claims, the insurer is liable for the
amount of the settlement attributable to covered claims. Maryland has
not decided whether the insurer or the insured should bear the burden of
persuading the fact-finder that part or all of the settlement was for covered claims, but it would appear that in order to foster prudent settlements of tort actions and discourage insurers from wrongfully
disclaiming coverage, the insurer should bear that burden. lSI

B.

No Creation of Coverage by Waiver or Equitable Estoppel

The duty to indemnify may not be predicated upon a breach of the
insurer's duty to defend. 152 Thus, an insurer that breaches its duty to
defend is not precluded by either waiver 153 or equitable estoppel' 54 from
later raising a defense to its duty to indemnify. Although waiver or equitable estoppel may prevent an insurer from asserting technical policy defenses, they may not be used by the insured to expand the policy to create
coverage that the insurer did not agree to undertake. ISS Therefore, the

150.

151.

152.
153.

154.

155.

settlement of an action for damages is something which the insured has 'become
legally obligated to pay' within the meaning of the insurance policy." /d. at 55-56.
See Harford Mut. Ins. Co. v. Jacobson, 73 Md. App. 670, 684, 536 A.2d 120, 127,
cert. denied, 312 Md. 601, 541 A.2d 964 (1988); Travelers Indem. Co. v. Insurance
Co. ofN. Am., 69 Md. App. 664, 519 A.2d 760 (1987); Oweiss, 67 Md. App. at 72021, 509 A.2d 715-16; see also Western World Ins. v. Harford Mut. Ins. Co., 784
F.2d 558 (4th Cir. 1986).
Comment, The Insurer's Duty, supra note 6, at 744 (to balance the policy that an
insurer should not be liable for risks not paid for by the insured against the policy
that settlements of lawsuits should be encouraged, the insurer should bear the burden of proving that all or part of insured's settlement was made on grounds outside
of coverage); see also A. WINDT, supra note 71, § 4.13, at 162-63.
Kelly v. Cherokee Ins. Co., 574 S.W.2d 735, 739 (Tenn. 1978).
Waiver is a "voluntary and intentional relinquishment of a known right." Progressive Casualty Ins. Co. v. Ehrhardt, 69 Md. App. 431,443, 518 A.2d 151, 157 (1986).
In order for a waiver to exist, the " 'acts relied upon ... must be inconsistent with
an intention to insist upon enforcing ... ' " the party's contractual rights. Rubenstein v. Jefferson Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 268 Md. 388, 392-93, 302 A.2d 49, 52 (1973)
(quoting Food Fair v. Blumberg, 234 Md. 521, 531, 200 A.2d 166, 172 (1964)).
"Waiver is closely inter-related and intertwined with estoppel." Gould v. Transamerican Assoc., 224 Md. 285, 295, 167 A.2d 905, 909 (1961). Estoppel is an equitable doctrine that prevents a party from asserting a right because the party has
conducted himself in such a manner that it would be contrary to equity and good
conscience to let him assert the right. Wright v. Wagner, 182 Md. 483, 492, 34
A.2d 441, 446 (1943). While the two terms are often used synonymously, they are
separate and distinct doctrines. For a discussion of the elements of waiver and estoppel, see Benson v. Borden, 174 Md. 202, 219-20, 198 A. 419, 427-28 (1938).
Traveler's Ins. Co. v. Godsey, 260 Md. 669, 675, 273 A.2d 431, 435 (1971); Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Coffman, 52 Md. App. 732, 742-43, 451 A.2d 952, 957
(1982). It is theoretically possible for the doctrine of equitable estoppel to expand
coverage under certain circumstances. The insured, however, must show detrimental reliance and, as the Fourth Circuit noted in Western World Ins. Co. v. Harford
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insurer will be able to assert that it had no duty to indemnify despite a
breach of its duty to defend. 156
The rationale for prohibiting an insured from asserting waiver or
equitable estoppel is sound. The duty to defend is broader than the duty
to indemnify, and an insurer may have a duty to deferid but no duty to
indemnify. 157 An insurer that breaches its contractual duty to defend
should not be punished by imposing on it the additional burden of an
expanded duty of indemnification. As one commentator has stated,
"[t]he insurer's breach of contract should not ... be used as a method of
. obtaining coverage for the insured that the insured did not purchase." 158
lfthe insurer owed a duty to defend but no duty to indemnify, then the
insured would receive the benefit of the bargain through an award of
defense costs. The judgment would have been the insured's responsibility
even if the insurer had defended.1s9
C

Defending Insurer's Right to Recover Costs from Co-Insurer That
Refuses to Defend

An insured is often protected by several layers of insurance at the
same time. Generally, the duty to defend rests with the primary carrier,
and an excess insurer's duty to defend arises only when the primary insurer's liability limits are exhausted. 160 The duty is not triggered merely
because the claims asserted in the tort action exceed the policy limits of
the primary policy. 161 Although an excess insurer usually does not have

156.
157.
158.

159.

160.
161.

Mut. Ins. Co., 784 F.2d 558 (4th Cir. 1986), it is difficult to imagine how an insured
could detrimentally rely on the insurer's refusal to defend, especially if the insurer
notified the insured in writing that it was disclaiming coverage. /d. at 563. A better
case for estoppel is made when the insurer defends without a reservation of rights
and then tries to assert that it has no duty to indemnify. See infra notes 243-285 and
accompanying text. For a discussion of the application of equitable estoppel, see
Note, Insurance-Equitable Estoppel-Doctrine of Equitable Estoppel Used to Bar
the Defense of Noncoverage by the Insurer and to Extend Coverage to Risks Not
Provided for or Excluded Expressly in the Policy, 15 VILL. L. REV. 505 (1970).
See Oweiss v. Erie Ins. Exch. Co., 67 Md. App. 712, 720, 509 A.2d 711, 715-16
(1986); A. WINDT, supra note 71, § 4.35, at 213-16.
See Washington Transit Auth. v. Bullock, 68 Md. App. 20, 40, 509 A.2d 1217,
1227, cert. denied, 308 Md. 237, 238, 517 A.2d 1120, 1121 (1986).
A. WINDT, supra note 71, § 4.35, at 213 (quoted in Rairigh, 59 Md. App. at 317,
475 A.2d at 515); see also St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Molloy, 291 Md. 139,
146-47 n.4, 433 A.2d 1135, 1139 n.4 (1981); cf Neuman v. Travelers Indem. Co.,
271 Md. 636, 654, 319 A.2d 522, 531-32 (1974).
Rairigh, 59 Md. App. at 317, 475 A.2d at 515 (citing J. APPLEMAN, INSURANCE
LAW AND PRACTICE § 4689 (Berdal ed. 1982)) ("Where there is no coverage, the
greatest injury that the insured could have suffered by a failure to defend is the cost
of defense-the judgment would have been his responsibility regardless."); see 14 G.
COUCH, CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAW§ 51:73 (2d ed. 1982) (quoted with approval in Rairigh, 59 Md. App. at 318, 475 A.2d at 515).
For an explanation of excess and primary insurance, see supra notes 15, 17 and
accompanying text.
See Rairigh, 59 Md. App. at 323, 475 A.2d at 517-18; cf Fireman's Fund v. Continental Ins. Co., 308 Md. 315, 519 A.2d 202 (1987) (excess carrier allowed to sue
primary carrier for bad faith based on equitable subrogation principles; court did
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a duty to defend, some excess policies require an excess insurer to defend
if there is no other applicable insurance. 162 Moreover, when a primary
insurer wrongfully fails to defend, an excess insurer may be required to
assume the defense in order to protect the insured's interests. 163
If the insured is covered by two insurers that are equally obligated
to defend, and one refuses, the non-breaching insurer is entitled to recover part of the costs it incurred in the defense of the tort action 164 and
all of the costs of prosecuting a declaratory judgment action. Similarly, if
an excess insurer assumes the defense following the primary carrier's
wrongful breach, the primary insurer is liable to the excess carrier for the
litigation expenses and attorney's fees incurred in defending the underlying tort action and in bringing or defending a declaratory judgment action.165 In either situation, the right of the non-breaching insurer to
recover the costs of prosecuting the declaratory judgment action is based
on the notion that the breaching carrier "authorized" the expense by its
refusal to defend, as well as on contractual and equitable subrogation
principles. 166

162.
163.

164.

165.
166.

not decide if the primary carrier owed a direct and independent duty to the excess
carrier). For a general discussion of the duties and obligations that run between
primary and excess insurers, see Lanzone & Ringel, Duties of a Primary Insurer to
An Excess Insurer, 61 NEB. L. REv. 259 (1982); Comment, Primary and Excess
Insurers and Their Common Insured: The Triangular Relationship with No Love
Lost, 32 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 265 (1981).
See Rairigh, 59 Md. App. at 323, 475 A.2d at 517-18.
See Western World Ins. Co. v. Harford Mut. Ins. Co., 600 F. Supp 313, 321 (D.
Md. 1984), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 784 F.2d 558 (4th Cir. 1986); see also
Employers Liab. Assurance Corp. v. Indemnity Ins. Co., 228 F. Supp. 896 (D. Md.
1964).
See Ryder Truck Rental, Inc. v. Schapiro & Whitehouse, 259 Md. 354, 269 A.2d
826 (1970). In Ryder, both insurers provided excess coverage only, and the court
ruled that each would share the liability and defense costs equally. Id. at 364-65,
269 A.2d at 831-32; see also Centennial Ins. Co. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,
71 Md. App. 152, 164, 524 A.2d 110, 116 (both insurers provided "pro rata" coverage, and the court ruled that each would share the defense and liability costs "on the
basis of their relative liability exposure"), cert. denied, 310 Md. 491, 530 A.2d 273
(1987).
Travelers Indem. Co. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 69 Md. App. 664, 678-79, 519
A.2d 760, 767-68 (1987).
/d. at 677-80, 519 A.2d at 767-68 ("[I]nsurer is subrogated to claims of its insured
against other insurer, whether ex contractu or ex delicto, once the insurer has indemnified the insured for his loss."); see also Western World Ins. Co. v. Harford
Mut. Ins. Co., 602 F. Supp 36 (D. Md. 1985) (defending insurer's recovery against
breaching insurer is based on principles of contractual and equitable subrogation),
aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 784 F.2d 558 (4th Cir. 1986). In
Travelers Indemnity, the court also noted that "[t]he rights to which the insurer is
subrogated have been broadly described as, 'all the rights of recovery of the insured
of every nature, whatsoever.' " Travelers Indemnity, 69 Md. App. at 680, 519 A.2d
at 768 (quoting Svea Assurance Co. v. Packham, 92 Md. 464, 465 (1901) (statements in appellants brief). Contractual subrogation is also known as conventional
subrogation. Equitable subrogation is sometimes called legal subrogation. For a
discussion of the elements of both, see Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Hartford Accident & lndem. Co., 74 Md. App. 539, 539 A.2d 239 (1988).
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If an insured has been sued and the claimant's pleadings raise a potentiality of coverage, the insured must comply with the policy's conditions precedent to succesfully enforce the insurer's duties under the
policy. Under most policies, the insured is contractually obligated to notify the insurer about a potential claim and to cooperate with the insurer
in the investigation and defense of any claim made against him. 167 An
insurer is relieved of its duties to defend and indemnify if the insured
breaches either his duty to notify or his duty to cooperate and the breach
results in actual prejudice to the insurer. 168
Under the standard policy, the insured must notify his insurer of
potential claims as soon as is practicable. 169 In addition, if he is to receive the litigation protection afforded by the policy, the insured must
make a timely request for a defense. 170 Notifying the insurer that he has
been served with the claimant's pleadings and forwarding the pleadings
to the insurer may not be enough to constitute a defense request, 171 and
an insured would be wise to send a written request to the insurer along
with the pleadings. A request made after a judgment has been entered is
clearly not timely, and the mere entering of the adverse judgment is affirmative evidence of actual prejudice to the insurer. 172
167. For a discussion of the standard cooperation clause, see 2 R. LONG & M. RHODES,
supra note 67, § 14.01.
168. Section 482 of article 48A of the Maryland Annotated Code provides:
Where any insurer seeks to disclaim coverage on any policy of liability
insurance issued by it, on the ground that the insured or anyone claiming
the benefits of the policy through the insured has breached the policy by
failing to cooperate with the insurer or by not giving requisite notice to the
insurer, such disclaimer shall be effective only if the insurer establishes, by
a preponderance of affirmative evidence that such lack of cooperation or
notice has resulted in actual prejudice to the insurer.
MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 482 (1986); see Travelers Ins. Co. v. Godsey, 260 Md.
669, 673, 273 A.2d 431,433-34 (1971) (failure of insured to cooperate); State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Hearn, 242 Md. 575, 581-84, 219 A.2d 820, 824-26 (1966)
(lack of requisite notice).
169. Whether notice of an occurrence was given by the insured to the insurer as soon as
practicable is a question of fact. See Hearn, 242 Md. at 581, 219 A.2d at 823.
170. Washington v. Federal Kemper Ins. Co., 60 Md. App. 288, 297-98, 482 A.2d 503,
507-08 (1984), cert. denied, 302 Md. 289, 487 A.2d 292 (1985).
171. But cf California Shoppers, Inc. v. Royal Globe Ins. Co., 175 Cal. App.3d 1, 37-38,
221 Cal. Rptr. 171, 189 (1985) (constructive notice of a claim to insurer constitutes
a request for a defense).
172. See Washington, 60 Md. App. at 296, 482 A.2d at 507. In Washington, the court
held that the insurer had no duty to indemnify the insured because the notice of a
claim made after a final judgment was affirmative evidence of prejudice to the insurer. Id. at 295-96, 482 A.2d at 507. The court also held that the insurer had no
duty to reimburse the insured for the costs of defense because the facts at trial
showed that the claim fell outside of the policy's coverage, implicitly suggesting that
the insurer did not show that it had been relieved of its defense obligation on the
grounds that it had been prejudiced by a late notice. Id. at 297-98, 482 A.2d at 50708.
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The insured's duty to cooperate requires him to make a complete
and truthful disclosure of facts related to the occurrence. In addition, he
has a good faith obligation to aid in formulating every legitimate defense
to the underlying tort action and to render assistance at trial. 173 Only by
fulfilling these duties will the insured receive the benefits of policy. 174

B.

Conflict of Interest Between the Insurer and the Insured

The duty to defend under the standard policy can be broken into
two distinct components: the insurer's right to control the defense, and
the insurer's obligation to pay the cost of the defense. 175 An insurer is
not relieved of its duty to defend its insured when a conflict of interest
arises over the defense of the case. 176 The insurer must first inform the
insured of the nature of the conflict and then give him a choice between
accepting an independent attorney selected by the insurer and selecting
his own attorney. 177 If the insured decides to choose his own attorney,
the insurer must reimburse the insured for the reasonable costs of the
defense. 178
There are two types of conflict of interest that can arise between an
insurer and its insured, and care should be taken to distinguish between
them. The first is a conflict with regard to the existence of the insurer's
duty to indemnify the insured; the second is a conflict with regard to the
insurer's conduct of the defense. 179 The former usually does not require
that the insured be offered independent counsel. The latter usually requires independent counsel if the insurer's potential liability could be reduced by its method of conducting the defense. 180
Conflicts of interest over the conduct of the defense arise from those
coverage questions which are "intertwined" in the underlying tort suit.
173. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Godsey, 260 Md. 669, 673, 273 A.2d 431, 433-34 (1971).
174. This assumes, of course, that the insurer has offered its insured a defense. A breaching insurer cannot require the insured to comply with technical policy conditions.
See infra text accompanying notes 232-235.
175. See Comment, The Insurer's Duty, supra note 6, at 738.
176. /d.; see also Brohawn v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 276 Md. 396, 409-10, 347 A.2d 842,
851 (1975).
177. Brohawn, 276 Md. at 414-15, 347 A.2d at 854. What constitutes an "independent
counsel" is a difficult question. It "may simply mean attorneys who are not direct
employees of the insurer. Or, more expansively viewed, it may mean attorneys who
do not regularly represent the insurer." Morris, supra note 137, at 487-88 (footnote
omitted). Windt suggests that in order to be an independent counsel, an attorney
retained by an insurer to represent an insured in a conflict of interest situation must
not be asked to comment on any coverage question by the insurer. Moreover, the
attorney's role must be explained to the insured in writing, and copies of the attorney's status reports should be sent to the insured. If these requirements are met,
Windt concludes, "there is no reason· why the insurer should, in theory, be precluded from hiring as independent counsel an attorney [whom] it has used in the
past to represent the insurer's interests." A. WINDT, supra note 71, § 4.20, at 179.
178. Brohawn, 276 Md. at 415, 347 A.2d at 854. See generally Comment, The Insurer's
Duty, supra note 6, at 738.
179. A. WINDT, supra note 71, § 4.18.
180. /d.
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A conflict may also arise from a "separate and distinct" coverage question, but such a conflict does not require the insurer to offer the insured a
choice of independent counsel.1 81 Independent counsel need be offered
only if a potentiality of coverage is created by an intertwined factual issue
and the insurer will be bound by the results in the underlying tort
action. 182
Brohawn, in which the claimants raised both intentional tort and
negligence claims, illustrates a common conflict of interest over the conduct of the case. The best result for both the insurer and the insured
would have been for the insured to be found not liable on either of the
claimants' theories. The insurer, however, would not have been obligated to pay if the insured were found liable on the intentional tort count,
because intentional torts were not covered by the policy. Conversly, the
insured would have prefered to be found liable, if at all, on the negligence
count, which was covered by the policy. Moreover, both the insured and
the insurer would have been bound by the results in the tort action.
These differing interests require the insurer to offer the insured a choice
of independent counsel in order to protect against the possible manipulation of the defense to establish noncoverage.
The existence of a conflict of interest over the conduct of the defense
in a potentiality situation varies from case to case. A Brohawn-type complaint gives rise to an inherent conflict. The conflict of interest doctrine,
however, is not limited to cases in which the pleadings allege negligence
and intentional torts as alternative theories of recovery. 183 A conflict of
interest over the conduct of the defense arises any time the insurer can
shape the defense to establish noncoverage. 184 Intertwined coverage
181. One commentator, however, has argued that:
[A)n inherent conflict of interest exists whenever the insurer disclaims liability for a suit it seeks to defend. The insured may have legitimate fears
regarding the insurer's motivation to settle or otherwise provide a vigorous
defense. In addition, the ever present danger that the insured may be required to produce evidence not otherwise available to the insurer that
could later be used to establish non-coverage justifies the insured's demand
that the insurer relinquish exclusive control of the defense.
Comment, Reservation of Rights Notices and Nonwaiver Ageements, 12 PAC. L.J.
763, 777-78 (1981) (footnotes omitted) [hereinafter Comment, Reservation of
Rights]. Contra A. WINDT, supra note 71, § 4.18.
182. See generally Browne, supra note 70, at 19 n. 5 ("If the results in the tort action are
immaterial as far as the coverage question is concerned, neither party will have any
incentive to force those results one way or the other, and there is no conflict.").
183. See Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Rairigh, 59 Md. App. 305, 320, 475 A.2d 509, 516,
cert. denied, 301 Md. 176, 482 A.2d 502 (1984).
184. In Southern Md. Agric. Ass'n v. Bituminous Casualty Corp., 539 F. Supp. 1295 (D.
Md. 1982), the court stated:
[I]f the ... claimants were to prevail at all, [the insurer] would certainly
prefer that they do so with respect to any claim other than the [covered]
claim. Under such circumstances, it is not unreasonable for the [insureds]
to be concerned as to the adequacy of representation by counsel not independent of the insurer. Consequently, they are entitled to independent
counsel under Brohawn.
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questions, such as whether the insured was acting within the scope of his
employment, 185 whether the insured was an employee or an independent
contractor, 186 whether the insured acted as an employee or in some other
capacity, 187 or even whether the insured's tortious acts fell within the
applicable policy dates 188 create conflicts of interest over the defense of
the case and require the insurer to offer the insured a choice of counsel.
Conflicts of interest in the conduct of the defense may also work to
the disadvantage of an insurer. 189 The insurer may be tempted to shape
the defense to establish noncoverage. The insured, on the other hand,
may have a conflict with his obligation to cooperate with the defense
because he has a desire to manipulate the facts to establish coverage.
Providing the insured with independent counsel, however, eliminates
only the possibility that the insurer will shape the defense to establish
noncoverage. It does not prevent the insured from shaping the defense to
establish coverage to the detriment of the insurer. 190
The insurer may use two strategies to prevent this outcome. First,
even if independent counsel is chosen, the insurer may still monitor the
case and participate in the investigation, defense and settlement. 191 The
insurer need relinquish only exclusive control of the defense. Nevertheless, participation in a defense conducted by independent counsel is not
/d. at 1304.
185. See, e.g., St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Pryseski, 292 Md. 187, 195-96, 438 A.2d
282, 286-87 (1981); Terra Nova Ins. Co. v. Chillum Corp., 71 Md. App. 552, 55659, 526 A.2d 642, 644-45, cert. denied, 311 Md. 22, 532 A.2d 168 (1987).
186. See, e.g., United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. National Paving & Contracting Co.,
228 Md. 40, 49-54, 178 A.2d 872, 876-78 (1962).
187. See, e.g., Ohio Casualty Ins. Co. v. Lee, 62 Md. App. 176, 185, 488 A.2d 988, 99293, cert. denied, 303 Md. 471, 494 A.2d 939 (1984).
188. See, e.g., Southern Md., 539 F. Supp. at 1304.
189. Browne, supra note 70, at 24.
190. /d.
191. See Comment, Reservation of Rights, supra note 181, at 779. Such a participation
occurred in Saba v. Darling, 72 Md. App. 487, 531 A.2d 696 (1987), cert. granted,
311 Md. 698, 537 A.2d 202 (1988), where Darling was sued for assault and negligence. The insurer complied with its Brohawn duty by supplying Darling with independent counsel to defend the negligence count, which was covered by the policy,
and by paying for a private attorney retained by Darling to defend the noncovered
assault count. At the close of his case, the plaintiff dismissed the assault count,
evidently knowing that Darling's policy excluded coverage for bodily injury intended by the insured. /d. at 489 n.l, 531 A.2d at 696 n.l. Darling's attorneys then
moved for judgment on the negligence count. The court denied the motion for judgment and let the case go to the jury. Although the jury returned a verdict for Darling, the insurer would have been collaterally estopped from denying a duty to
indemnify if the jury had returned a verdict against him.
Had the plaintiff's attorney not dismissed the assault count, it is unlikely that
either of Darling's attorneys would have moved for judgment on the negligence
count, because the motion, if granted, would have exposed Darling to personal liability. Darling's private attorney would undoubtedly have tried to protect his client
by letting the negligence count go to the jury. Darling's other attorney, although
hired by the insurer, owed Darling his utmost loyalty and could not have jeopardized Darling's interests by moving for judgment on the negligence count in order to
protect the insurer's interests.
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an entirely effective way for an insurer to protect its interests. Because
an insurer cannot directly advance its interests at the expense of the insured, participation often provides little more than means for monitoring
the progress of a case.
A second and more effective means of controlling the insured's ability to shape the defense arises from the insurer's right to intervene in the
suit to protect its own interests. An insurer with a potentiality issue that
cannot be litigated in a separate declaratory judgment action has the
right to intervene as a party in the underlying tort action brought against
its insured. 192 The insurer must have a legitimate interest in order to
intervene and must make a timely motion. 193 The right is not unqualified, and certain safeguards must be met in order to protect the insured
from being "cast adrift and left to fend for himself or herself against the
wealth and resources of the carrier." 194 Before intervening, the insurer
must fulfill its defense obligation by supplying independent counsel to its
insured or by paying the costs of the insured's counsel. 195 This safeguard
places both the insured and the insurer on an equal economic footing and
prevents the insurer from wresting control of the tort litigation from the
claimants and the insured.l96
Intervention is designed to prevent the insured, either by himself or
in collusion with the claimant, from shaping the facts to establish coverage. If the insurer were not able to intervene, then it might be collaterally estopped from raising the intertwined factual issues in a subsequent
action. 197 This fear of collusion between the insured and the claimant is
well-founded, for inventive attorneys have attempted to bind an insurer
by various means. 198 Nevertheless, intervention is not wholly satisfac192. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Atwood, 71 Md. App. 107, 523 A.2d 1066, cert. granted, 310
Md. 274, 528 A.2d 1286 (1987).
193. Hartford Ins. Co. v. Birdsong, 69 Md. App. 615, 519 A.2d 219 (1987) (intervention
not allowed because of untimeliness of request and insurer's lack of sufficient interest). A "legitimate interest" is a "direct, significant legally protectable interest."
Id. at 628, 519 A.2d at 226.
Maryland Rule 2-214 establishes two types of intervention: intervention of
right and permissive intervention. See MD. R. 2-214(a), (b). The rule does not specify a time limit for filing a motion to intervene, except to state that the motion must
be "timely." MD. R. 2-214(a), (b)(1). For a discussion of the factors to be considered in determining the timeliness of a motion to intervene, see Maryland Radiological Soc'y v. Health Serv. Cost Review Comm'n, 285 Md. 383, 402 A.2d 907 (1979).
194. Atwood, 71 Md. App. at 113, 523 A.2d at 1069.
195. /d. Only an insurer that honors its duty to defend by providing its insured with
counsel or paying for the insured's choice of counsel may intervene. A disclaiming
insurer has no right to intervene because it has no legally sufficient interest. See
Birdsong, 69 Md. App. at 629-30, 519 A.2d at 226.
196. Atwood, 71 Md. App. at 114, 523 A.2d at 1070.
197. See supra notes 136-145 and accompanying text.
198. Collusion can exist at any stage in the litigation-in the pleading stage, in settlement
negotiations between the claimant and the insured, and during trial. In Fireman's
Fund Ins. Co. v. Rairigh, 59 Md. App. 305, 475 A.2d 509, cert. denied, 301 Md.
176, 482 A.2d 502 (1984), the court of special appeals noted that a consent judgment conditioned upon the claimant's collecting the judgment from the insured's
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tory from the insurer's standpoint. It projects the question of the existence and availability of insurance into a tort action. 199 Furthermore,
intervention by an insurer in an underlying tort action based on alternative theories of negligent and intentional acts might actually increase the
insurer's exposure under the policy. At trial, for example, the insurer
might argue that the insured acted intentionally to avoid the policy coverage for negligence. If, however, the jury found that the insured actually acted recklessly as well as negligently, and it awarded punitiye
damages, the insurer would have contributed unwillingly to its own lia·
bility exposure. 200
Participation in the defense or outright intervention treats only a
symptom of the conflict of interest problem. As the drafter of the policy,
the insurer has the ability to treat the cause of the problem by redrafting
its defense obligation. For example, it could make the duty to defend
dependent on the duty to indemnify or on the claimant's alleging facts
which are actually within coverage. An insurer could also include a provision limiting its duty to defend the insured when a conflict of interest
arises. 201 The insured would then be responsible for his own defense
costs, but the insurer would still face possible liability l!nder its duty to
indemnify. The advantage of these limiting provisions, however, should
be weighed against the insurer's desire "to retain the absolute right to
control the defense where it may be liable." 202
A better approach may be for the insurer to limit its exposure by
providing that, in the case of a conflict of interest, the insured does not
have an unfettered choice of independent counsel but must choose from a
list of attorneys provided by the insurer. 203 Similarly, the policy could
allow the initial choice to lie with the insured but require the insurer's

199.

200.

201.
202.
203.

insurer would not bar the insurer from later denying coverage under its duty to
indemnify. Giving a preclusive effect to such a consent judgment would leave the
claimant and the insured free "to stipulate away the right of an absent insurer to
raise a legitimate defense to its liability" when the claimant seeks garnishment after
the entry of the court judgment. Id. at 322, 475 A.2d at 517. But see Steyer v.
Westvaco Corp., 450 F. Supp. 384 (D. Md. 1978).
While the existence and contents of a liability insurance policy are discoverable
under Maryland Rule 2-402(b), the fact that a party carries liability insurance is not
admissible to show that the party acted negligently. Snowhite v. State ex rei. Tennant, 243 Md. 291, 221 A.2d 342 (1966). It may be admissible for other purposes.
See generally, 5 L. MCLAIN, MARYLAND PRACTICE: MARYLAND EVIDENCE
§§ 411.1, 411.2 (1987).
This conclusion assumes, of course, that punitive damages are not excluded by the
policy. See First Nat'l Bank v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 283 Md. 228, 389 A.2d 359
(1978) (punitive damages must be expressJy excluded from a policy). The Brohawn
court addressed this issue briefly and from another direction, noting that the conflict
of interest between Transamerica and Brohawn would place Transamerica in a position to expose its insured to potential punitive damages. Brohawn v. Transamerica
Ins. Co., 276 Md. 396, 406, 347 A.2d 842, 849 (1975).
Brohawn, 276 Md. at 410, 347 A.2d at 851.
ld.
See Employers' Fire Ins. Co. v. Beals, 103 R.I. 623, 635, 240 A.2d 397, 404 (1968).
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approval of the choice. 204 Under either option, the insurer would retain
partial control over the defense of the case and could participate in the
settlement process. These choices are available to the insurers if they are
willing to deviate from old, familiar procedures and standard policy
language. 205
C

Notice Pleadings

The "notice" theory of pleading underlying the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure206 creates an inherent conflict with the exclusive pleading rule. 207 The Federal Rules require only that the allegations in a
pleading be "simple, concise and direct" 208 and that the pleading set
forth a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the [claimant] is entitled to relief." 209 There is no requirement that a pleading state
"facts" supporting the allegations. 210 While "no pleading system operates with sufficient precision to predict insurance coverage," 211 the notice
pleading system assails the validity and efficacy of the exclusive pleading
rule. 212 The stricter pleading requirements of the past gave ari insurer
substantially more information on which to decide a duty-to-defend
204. In both Rhode Island and New York, the insured's choice of counsel in a conflictof-interest situation must be approved by the insurer. The insurer can reject the
insured's attorney, but must do so in good faith. See id. at 635, 240 A.2d at 404;
New York State Urban Dev. Corp. v. VSL Corp., 738 F.2d 61, 65-66 (2d Cir. 1984).
205. Insurers appear to be wedded to the standard forms, and change from standard
provisions is a slow process. In 1978, for example, the court of appeals held that
punitive damages were covered by liability policies unless specifically excluded from
coverage. First Nat'l Bank v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 283 Md. 228, 389 A.2d 359
(1978). The obvious solution for the insurers was to exclude punitive damages from
coverage, but most policies issued today still do not contain the necessary exclusion.
But see Treanor, Mischief with Malice: A Review of Liability for Punitive Damages
and the Insured's Right to Indemnity Against An Exemplary Award, 8 U. BALT. L.
REV. 222, 263-70 (1979) (suggesting that the Maryland Insurance Division has hesitated to permit exclusion of punitive damages without explicit direction from the
judiciary or legislature).
206. See generally 2 J. MOORE, J. LUCAS & G. GOTHER JR., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE ~ 8.13, at 8-61 to 8-62 (2d ed. 1987) [hereinafter MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE). The purpose of the Federal Rules "is to give fair notice of the claim asserted
so as to enable the adverse party to answer and prepare for trial, to allow for the
application of the doctrine of res judicata, and to show the type of case brought, so
that it may be assigned to the proper form of trial." /d.
207. See supra notes 29-48 and accompanying text.
208. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(e)(l).
209. /d. 8(a)(2).
210. MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 206, § 8.13, at 8-60, 8-66.
211. lA R. LONG & M. RHODES, supra note 67, § 5.02.
212. This observation, made by many commentators, is summed up nicely by Long and
Rhodes:
Indeed, notice pleading may become so ambiguous and non-committal
that the defendants do not reasonably know what is being alleged. In addition, due to the vague nature of notice pleadings, it is quite common
today for an insurer to either know of or be able to readily discover facts
which would require it to defend if actually pled by the claimant.
I d.
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question. 213 The continued viability of the exclusive pleading rule in
light of the notice theory underlying current pleading systems has been
questioned by both commentators214 and the courts. 215
The Maryland Rules of Civil Procedure, although modeled after the
Federal Rules, have not adopted the "notice" theory ofpleading. 216 Like
the Federal Rules, the Maryland Rules require that a complaint be "simple, concise and direct." 217 Unlike the federal mandate of a "short and
plain statement of the claim," however, the Maryland Rules require "a
clear statement of the facts necessary to constitute a cause of action." 218
From an insurer's standpoint, the Maryland Rules' retention of "fact"
pleading alleviates much of the insurer's burden of determining whether
it must defend its insured.
Nevertheless, the Maryland Rules are problematic in determining
when a pleading establishes an insurer's duty to defend. With technical
forms of pleading eliminated,2 19 the Maryland Rules can be considered a
modified "notice" pleading system. The rules allow a claimant to "set
forth two or more statements of a claim ... alternatively or hypothetically."220 Moreover, a claimant "may also state as many separate claims
213. See Babcock & Wilcox v. Parsons, 430 F.2d 531 (8th Cir. 1970). See generally
MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 206, §§ 8.04, 8.13.
214. See, e.g., Comment, The Insurer's Duty, supra note 6, at 749.
215. See, e.g., Gray v. Zurich Ins. Co., 65 Cal. 2d 263, 419 P.2d 168, 54 Cal. Rptr. 104
(1966). In Ritchie v. Anchor Casualty Co., 135 Cal. App. 2d 245, 286 P.2d 1000
(1955), the court criticized the exclusive pleading rule, stating that "[t]he draftsman
of the complaint against the insured is not interested in the question of coverage
which later arises between insurer and insured." Id. at 251, 286 P.2d at 1003. This
conclusion, however, is questionable. In niost cases, the draftsman is concerned
with the question of insurance, since the existence of insurance may provide his
client with a means of recovering a judgment from an otherwise insolvent party.
The facts of Brohawn, for example, demonstrate that the plaintiffs' attorney
amended the complaint by adding a negligence count in order to provide his clients
access to Brohawn's liability policy. See Brohawn v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 276
Md. 396, 400-01, 347 A.2d 842, 846 (1975); see also supra notes 53-56 and accompanying text. This practice is quite common in cases centering on an assault, and
almost every plaintiffs' attorney knows that he should add a simple negligence count
in order to create a "potentiality of coverage." See Browne, supra note 70, at 27-28.
216. Compare MD. R. 2-303(a) ("All averments of claim ... shall be made in numbered
paragraphs, the contents of each of which shall be limited as far as practicable to a
statement of a single set of circumstances ... .")with id. 2-303(b) ("A pleading shall
contain only such statements of fact as may be necessary to show the pleader's entitlement to relief or ground of defense."). See generally P. NIEMEYER & L. RICHARDS, MARYLAND RULES COMMENTARY 135 (1984) (Rule 2-305 "continues the
distinction which has always existed between pleading in the Maryland Courts and
the federal courts. While F[ed]. R. Civ. P. 8(a) requires that a pleading contain a
short and plain statement of the claim showing that the plaintiff is entitled to relief,
[Maryland Rule 2-305] requires a statement of facts essential to state a cause of
action.").
217. Mo. R. 2-303(b).
218. ld. 2-305; cf id. 2-303(b) (A complaint shall "contain only such statements of fact
as may be necessary to show the pleader's entitlement to relief.... ").
219. ld. 2-303(b).
220. ld. 2-303(c).

1988]

Insurer's Duty to Defend in Maryland

39

or defenses as [he] has, regardless of consistency and whether based on
legal or equitable grounds." 221 The admonition that a pleading be "simple, concise and direct," along with acceptance of multiple count complaints and inconsistent allegations, affect the insurer's defense
responsibility by creating a pleading environment in which "potentialities" of coverage based on ambiguous, vague, incomplete, or broad· and
conclusory allegations flourish.
Both the Federal and Maryland Rules provide mechanisms for allowing an insurer to assess its duty to defend when it is faced with a barebones or ambiguous pleading. A motion for a more definite statement
and the various discovery devices can be used to help an insurer evaluate
its duty to defend completely, but these procedures can only be used after
the insurer has assumed the defense. Thus, an insurer faced with a barebones or ambiguous pleading under either the Federal or the Maryland
Rules should assume the defense under a reservation of rights, 222 then
monitor the case closely to determine if information obtained through
the normal litigation process relieves it of its duty to defend. 223 If the
information shows that its defense duties have ended, the insurer should
file declaratory judgment action to have the court determine its rights.
A prudent insurer will not withdraw without obtaining a court declaration that its defense obligation has ceased.

a

D. • Apportionment

If the insurer has a duty to defend any part of a multiple-count lawsuit, then it generally has the duty to defend the entire lawsuit. 224 In the
usual case, when the insurer assumes the defense it is responsible for defending all the allegations against the insured, not merely those that fall
actually or potentially within the coverage. 225 In some situations, however, when defense costs can be readily apportioned between covered and
noncovered items, the insurer can provide a partial defense. This can be
done in two ways. If the insured has accepted the insurer's independent
counsel, then the independent counsel would defend only those counts
which fall actually or potentially within coverage. The insured would be
tesponsible for retaining his own attorney to defend those counts that fall
221. /d.
222. See infra notes 249-256 and accompanying text.
223. In Steyer v. Westvaco Corp., 450 F. Supp. 384 (D. Md. 1978), the court stated that
the insurer had a continuing duty to defend that would be relieved when, if ever, the
facts showed that the claimant's claims were limited to those outside of coverage.
/d. at 389; see also supra notes 110-112 and accompanying text.
224. See, e.g., Southern Md. Agric. Ass'n v. Bituminous Casualty Corp., 539 F. Supp.
1295, 1299 (D. Md. 1982); Brohawn v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 276 Md. 396, 407-08,
347 A.2d 842, 850 (1975); Loewenthal v. Security Ins. Co., 50 Md. App. 112, 436
A.2d 493 (1981), cert. denied, 292 Md. 596 (1982); Minnick's, Inc. v. Reliance Ins.
Co., 47 Md. App. 329, 422 A.2d 1028 (1980); accord Continental Casualty Co. v.
Board of Educ., 302 Md. 516, 489 A.2d 536 (1985).
225. See Harford Mut. Ins. Co. v. Jacobson, 73 Md. App. 670, 678-79, 536 A.2d 120,
124, cert. denied, 312 Md. 601, 541 A.2d 964 (1988).
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outside of coverage. 226 Alternatively, if the insured has selected his own
independent attorney, then the insurer would pay that attorney for the
cost of defending the counts that fall actually or potentially within coverage. In a multiple c.ount claim, for instance, an insurer may apportion
the defense costs between counts that are actually or potentially covered
and counts that are not covered, if there is a reasonable means of properly apportioning the costs. 227 In the usual case, however, there is no
reasonable means of prorating the costs, and separate representation for
covered and noncovered counts is not feasible. 228
If apportionment is possible and the insured has retained his own
counsel, then the insurer is responsible only for the fees and expenses that
are reasonably related to the defense of a covered claim. 229 Legal fees
and services are reasonably related to a covered count if they would have
been rendered by reasonably competent counsel engaged to defend a suit
involving only the covered count. 230 The insured has the burden of proving that a given item of legal expense or service was reasonably related to
the defense of a covered count. 2 31
VI.

A.

AN INSURER'S ALTERNATIVES

Decline to Defend

An insurer faced with a potentiality question has several alternatives. 232 First, it may refuse to defend. This approach is neither practical
nor advisable. A disclaiming insurer waives its right to rely on technical
policy defenses and provisions. 233 It also loses the right to insist on the
insured's cooperation with the investigation and defense of the underlying tort action, and it surrenders the ability to select defense counsel and
control the litigation. The insurer's disclaimer also allows the insured to
enter into settlements and releases without the insurer's consent, thus
226. See Minnick's, 47 Md. App. at 333-34, 422 A.2d at 1029-30.
227. See Steyer, 450 F. Supp. at 390; see also Reliance Ins. Co. v. Mogavero, 640 F. Supp.
84 (D. Md. 1986). In Mogavero, the court noted that requiring an insurer to provide
a defense for all of the claims in a multiple count complaint, where it was clear that
there was no potentiality of coverage for the overwhelming majority of the claims,
would substantially expand the insurer's obligations under the policy beyond those
reasonably contemplated by the parties. ld. at 87.
228. Compare Brohawn, 276 Md. at 407, 347 A.2d at 850-52 (separate representation not
feasible) with Minnick's, 47 Md. App. at 333-34, 422 A.2d at 1030 (separate representation feasible).
229. Continental Casualty Co. v. Board of Educ., 302 Md. 516, 489 A.2d 536 (1985).
230. Id. at 532, 489 A.2d at 544.
231. ld. But see Southern Md. Agric. Ass'n v. Bituminous Casualty Corp., 539 F. Supp.
1295 (D. Md. 1982) (insurer may bear burden of proving feasibility of
apportionment).
232. Cf Glens Falls Ins. Co. v. American Oil Co., 254 Md. 120, 136, 254 A.2d 658, 66667 (1969) (an insurer has three options: decline to defend; defend under reservation;
or seek declaratory judgment). See generally Dohoney, supra note 6, at 471.
233. See United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. National Paving & Contracting Co., 228
Md. 40, 47-49, 178 A.2d 872, 875-76 (1962).
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destroying the insurer's subrogation rights. 234 Finally, a refusal to defend may lead to the insurer's breaching its good faith duty to settle
within policy limits.z3s
Under some circumstances it may appear that there are legitimate
practical and tactical reasons for flatly refusing to defend. An insurer
faced with a potentiality problem would save the cost of defense if it were
subsequently shown that the refusal was proper. Furthermore, even
where coverage is fairly certain, an insurer might weigh the likelihood of
various outcomes and conclude that the benefits of disclaiming coverage
outweigh the risks. 236
Perhaps the primary reason for not defending is the belief that the
denial will control defense costs by making the insured's attorney aware
that he might have to look solely to a cost-conscious client for his fees,
rather than to the economic resources of an insurance carrier. Although
this theory is attractive, its true economic value is questionable. The insured's independent counsel is already restrained by the concept of "reasonable" attorney's fees. In addition, the insured's attorney may charge
a higher hourly rate than does the insurer's defense counsel, thus nullifying the economic benefit of limiting the insured's attorney's hours. The
insurer is not entitled to determine the reasonableness of the fees by comparing them to insurance defense counsel fees; reasonable fees are determined by the market as a whole, not by the insurance defense market. 237
The insurer's ability to restrain the fees of an independent counsel is
therefore doubtful at best. 238
Other factors indicate that disclaiming coverage, even in those cases
involving "close" coverage questions, is extremely risky. A judgment
against the insured may be substantially higher than if the insurer had
defended and thus had been able to control the litigation. 239 Furthermore, if courts extend the tort of bad faith to the duty to defend, an
insurer that refuses to defend for economic reasons could be held liable
for consequential damages beyond ordinary contract damages. 240
The final reason for refusing to defend is that it places the burden on
the insured to file a declaratory judgment action to establish the insurer's
defense duty. 241 This small benefit is substantially outweighed by the fact
234. A. WINDT, supra note 71, § 3.10, at 123; see also id. § 5.15, at 261.
235. See id. § 5.01, at 232-35.
236. The insurer's benefits would be maximized, for example, if the refusal to defend acts
as an additional economic restraint on the insured's counsel; if the insured is likely
to prevail in the underlying tort action or settlement is likely to be either moderate
or based on matters outside coverage; and if the insurer is able to settle the insured's
declaratory judgment action and claim for damages arising from the insurer's
breach for a reduced amount.
237. See Browne, supra note 70, at 25.
238. See Comment, Reservation of Rights, supra note 181, at 779.
239. See Browne, supra note 70, at 25.
240. See infra notes 286-307 and accompanying text.
241. The statute of limitations, under the discovery standard generally applicable in
Maryland, begins to run when the insured discovers that the insurer will not defend.
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that the insurer will be responsible for the insured's attorney's fees in
both a declaratory judgment action, if the insured is successful, and in
the underlying tort action.
In general, then, an insurer's option of refusing to defend is usually
outweighed by practical considerations. The decision to decline to defend must be a studied one, and it will be the rare case where it will be
found advisable. Moreover, if the tort of bad faith is extended to the
duty to defend, then refusing to defend will lose what little practical and
tactical advantage it has. Accordingly, an insurer should hesitate to refuse to defend in all but the clearest of cases.

B.

Defend Without Reservation

The second alternative for an insurer faced with a potentiality issue
is to defend without reservation. This is equally as unappealing as the
first alternative. An insurer that defends without reservation will be
deemed to have waived its technical policy defenses, 242 and under certain
circumstances, it may also be estopped from asserting substantive policy
defenses. 243 In particular, it may be prevented from asserting that it has
no duty to indemnify the insured if the insured can establish that he detrimentally relied on the insurer's assuming the defense without
reservation.
Although it is clear that insurance coverage cannot be created or
expanded by the doctrine of waiver,244 there is some question whether it
See Mraz v. American Universal Ins. Co., 616 F. Supp. 1173, 1177 (D. Md. 1985)
(citing American Home Assurance Co. v. Osbourn, 47 Md. App. 73, 84, 422 A.2d 8,
14-15 (1980), cert. denied, 289 Md. 739 (1981)), rev'd sub nom. on other grounds,
Mraz v. Canadian Universal Ins. Co., 804 F.2d 1325 (4th Cir. 1986).
242. Columbia Casualty Co. v Ingram, 154 Md. 360, 140 A. 601 (1928); London & Lancashire lndem. Co. v. Cosgriff, 144 Md. 660, 125 A. 529 (1924).
243. In considering whether an insurer may waive an inapplicability of its policy, the
court of appeals, in Bowers & Kaufman v. Bothwell, 152 Md. 392, 136 A. 892
(1927), noted that:
[I)t is not a forfeiture that is to be found waived, nor a violation of a
condition or any irregularity; it is an inapplicability of the policy, so that
the waiver argued for would be, in effect, an extension of the contract
beyond its defined limits, or a new contract. Such an extension would, at
least, we think, require an estoppel, if not a new consideration, to support
it.
/d. at 397, 136 A. at 894. In Prudential Ins. Co. v. Brookman, 167 Md. 616, 175 A.
838 (1934), the court, after reviewing its decision in Bowers, stated:
And it is doubted whether an estoppel, strictly speaking, could suffice to
create a new contract. ... Waiver or estoppel can only have a field of
operation when the subject-matter is within the terms of the contract....
Whatever the description of the process, it must include the ordinary essentials of a contract and among them a meeting of the minds of the parties in the [extension of the original contract).
/d. at 620-21, 175 A. at 840; see also supra notes 152-159 and accompanying text.
244. American Auto Ins. Co. v. Master Bldg. Supply & Lumber. Co., 179 F. Supp. 699
(D. Md. 1959); see also supra notes 152-159 and accompanying text.
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can be extended by the doctrine of estoppel.245 Maryland cases invariably treat waiver and estoppel together and then conclude simply that
coverage cannot be created by waiver. 246 What the courts seem to suggest in their analyses is that as a matter of law, waiver cannot expand
coverage, and under the facts of the various cases, estoppel will rarely
expand coverage. 247 The implication of these analyses, however, is that
under proper circumstances an insurer can be estopped from denying it
has a duty to indemnify. For example, if the potentiality of coverage
created a conflict of interest and the insured was not allowed to choose
his own counsel, then the insured's reliance on the insurer's unqualified
defense and his forfeiture of his right to independent counsel might justify finding an estoppel. The insured surely has been misled; whether he
has been injured and has changed his position for the worse will depend
upon the facts of each case. 248 If estoppel can expand coverage under
these circumstances, then an insurer that chooses to defend without reserving its right to raise a defense to its duty to indemnify may be precluded from later asserting that it has no duty to indemnify.
C

Defend Under Reservation

A third alternative, and the preferable one, is for the insurer to offer
the insured a defense under either a non-waiver agreement or a reservation-of-rights notice. The insurer can then pursue a declaratory judg245. See Snyder v. Travelers Ins. Co., 251 F. Supp. 76 (D. Md. 1966) (applying Maryland law). Noting that the subject matter of the insurance coverage may not be
extended by waiver, the court stated that this rule "may not be correct as to the
doctrine of estoppel." /d. at 80. The court, however, concluded that under the facts
of the case, the essential elements of an estoppel were missing. /d.
246. For an example of this type of analysis, see Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth.
v. Bullock, 68 Md. App. 20, 39-40, 509 A.2d 1217, 1226-27, cert. denied, 308 Md.
237, 517 A.2d 1120 (1986).
247. See Haines v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 428 F. Supp. 435 (D. Md. 1977)
(applying Maryland law). In Haines, the court stated:
Even assuming that in a proper case, coverage can be afforded or extended
by estoppel ... the rule in Maryland is that: For principles of estoppel to
be applicable, the party claiming the benefit of estoppel must have been
misled to his injury and changed his position for the worse, having believed and relied upon the representations of the party sought to be
estopped.
/d. at 442 (citations omitted). The court, after stating the necessary elements of an
estoppel, concluded:
In the face of the clear language of the St. Paul [reservation-of-rights] letter, plaintiffs cannot assert a good faith reliance based on prior or subsequent acts by St. Paul. Plaintiffs accepted the defense subject to the
conditions imposed in the letter which included St. Paul's absolute right to
withdraw at any time upon written notice .... Knowing the limits of St.
Paul's undertaking, plaintiffs cannot assert that defendant is estopped
from denying coverage.
/d. at 443; see also Snyder, 251 F. Supp. at 80 (applying Maryland law) (essential
elements of an estoppel were missing under the facts of the case).
248. See Haines, 428 F. Supp. at 442.
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ment action249 if coverage h,inges on issues "independent and separable"
from the underlying tort action.
When an insurer wants to defend despite a conflict of interest, it
should, as a precaution, make its position known to its insured by either
entering into a non-waiver agreement with the insured or by sending the
insured a reservation-of-rights notice. Non-waiver agreements and reservation-of-rights notices are designed to allow the insurer to honor its
duty to defend while preserving its right to deny coverage under its duty
to indemnify. These precautionary devices benefit both the insurer and
the insured. 250 The non-waiver agreement or reservation-of-rights notice
allows the insurer to control the defense, contain defense costs, effect a
reasonable settlement and avoid litigation expenses in a declaratory judgment action. The insured in tum receives a defense, avoids litigation expenses in a declaratory action and receives the benefit of any settlement
entered into by the insurer. 25t
Both non-waiver agreements and reservation-of-rights notices are
valid in Maryland. 252 The former is a bilateral agreement between the
insurer and insured; the latter is a unilateral notice, usually in the form of
a letter from the insurer, which becomes binding if the insured does not
object. 253 The agreement and notice are designed to inform the insured
that while the insurer is defending the action, it believes it has no obligation to indemnify him.
Although Maryland courts have recognized the existence and extensive use of both non-waiver agreements and reservation-of-rights notices/54 the courts have not clearly delineated what they must contain to
be valid. In order to be effective, non-waiver agreements and reservationof-rights notices should provide sufficient information to enable the insured to make an informed judgment on whether he wants the insurer to
continue with the defense. 255 A reservation-of-rights notice should also
indicate that the insured's silence will constitute an acceptance of the
249. An insurer also has the option to seek declaratory relief if it declines to defend or
defends without reservation. See Note, Use of the Declaratory Judgment to Determine a Liability Insurer's Duty to Defend-Conflict of Interests, 41 IND. L. REV. 87,
92 (1965).
250. See American Auto. Ins. Co. v. Master Bldg. Supply & Lumber Co., 179 F. Supp.
699, 705 (D. Md. 1959).
251. See generally Comment, Reservation of Rights, supra note 181, at 764.
252. Island Mut. Ins. Co. v. Davenport, 247 F. Supp. 387 (D. Md. 1965).
253. Id. at 392.
254. See Master Bldg. Supply & Lumber Co., 179 F. Supp. at 704-05; see also Hardware
Mut. Casualty Co. v. Mitnick, 180 Md. 604, 26 A.2d 393 (1942).
255. Not every reservation-of-rights letter gives rise to a conflict of interests. See generally A. WINDT, supra note 71, § 4.18, at 169-74. One commentator has stated that a
non-waiver agreement or a reservation-of-rights notice must provide the insured
with enough information for him to make "a knowing, intelligent wavier" of his
right to an unconditional defense. Comment, Reservation of Rights, supra note 181,
at 785-86. In a conflict of interest situation, non-waiver agreements or reservationof-rights notices should contain the following information:
1. A clear denial of liability under the duty to indemnify;
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insurer's offer to defend. 256 Once the insurer has properly reserved its
right to contest its duty to indemnify, it can then decide whether it is
possible and desirable to pursue a declaratory judgment action at the
same time that it defends the underlying tort action.
The insurer's alternative of defending under a reservation of rights
and, if feasible and desirable, pursuing a declaratory judgment is clearly
the approach favored by the Maryland courts. Under Brohawn and its
progeny, the insurer has a near absolute duty to defend whenever its insured is sued. This places the burden on the insurer to bring a declaratory judgment action to determine that no coverage exists. It also fulfills
the insured's reasonable expectations and otherwise protects the insured
from the insurer's mistakes of judgment in evaluating its duty to defend.
The logical extension of the Brohawn rule is to find that the insurer has
an absolute duty to defend whenever its insured is sued, unless a court
declares that no duty to defend exists.

VII. EMERGING PROBLEMS
A. Beyond the Text: The Duty to Investigate
Under the exclusive pleading rule, an insurer determines whether it
should defend its insured by comparing the allegations in the claimant's
pleadings to the scope of coverage offered by the policy. 257 If the allegations fall actually or potentially within the insurer's duty to indemnify,
then the insurer must defend even if it possesses knowledge that demonstrates no duty to indemnify actually exists. 258 On its face, the exclusive
pleading rule benefits the insured. It can work to the insured's detriment, however, if the alleged facts indicate that the insurer does not have
a duty to indemnify, but the duty exists under the actual facts of the
controversy. In such a case, the insurer would not. ordinarily be obligated to defend. 259 The inequity of this result has led courts to carve out
2. A clear statement that the insurer is defending the action but believes
that it may not have a duty to indemnify;
3. An explanation of the denial of coverage, including a description of
the specific grounds and provisions of the policy on which the denial is
based;
4. A complete disclosure of the existence and nature of the conflict of
interest;
5. Detailed notification of the insured's Brohawn options. with specific
reference to the insured's right to decline the insurer's offer of a defense
and his right to choose an independent counsel to conduct his defense at
the insurer's options;
6. A recommendation that the insured seek the advice of counsel before
signing the non-waiver agreement or agreeing to the reservation-of-rights
notice.
256.
257.
258.
259.

/d.
/d. at 786-87.
See supra notes 29-48 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 62-72 and accompanying text.
This is a situation where the insurer would have no duty to defend but might have a
duty to indemnify.
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an exception to the exclusive pleading rule which requires the insurer to
defend when the alleged facts show noncoverage but the actual facts indicate coverage. 260 Maryland courts have not had the opportunity to consider the validity of the exception, 261 but it would be a logical and natural
extension of Brohawn and its progeny.262
The exception to the exclusive pleading rule requires the insurer to
defend its insured if it knows or should know of facts that indicate a
possibility of coverage, notwithstanding allegations that indicate noncoverage. 263 The exception flows naturally from the Brohawn rule because
in determining the intent of the parties to an insurance contract, the
courts consider the reasonable expectations of the insured, 264 and under a
standard liability policy, an insured reasonably expects that the insurer
will defend him whenever there is a potentiality of coverage based on a
claim. 265 The insured surely does not expect that the insurer's duty to
260. There is a conflict among the jurisdictions as to the applicability of the exclusive
pleading rule "when the insurer has knowledge of actual facts which are different
from those alleged in the underlying complaint." American Policyholders' Ins. Co.
v. Cumberland Cold Storage Co., 373 A.2d at 247, 250 n.l (Me. 1978). A growing
number of coutts apply the "factual inclusionary" exception. See Note, Liability
Insurer's Duty to Defend: American Policyholders' Ins. Co. v. Cumberland Cold Storage Co., 30 ME. L. REv. 295, 295-96 (1979) [hereinafter Note, Liability Insurer's
Duty].
261. But see Terra Nova Ins. Co. v. Chillum Corp., 71 Md. App. 552, 559, 526 A.2d 642,
645, cert. denied, 311 Md. 22, 532 A.2d 168 (1987). Although the opinion in Terra
Nova is not clear, it can be read as an application of the factual test.
262. Windt observes that the logic behind the exception is "unassailable." A. WINDT,
supra note 71, § 4.03, at 137. The foundation for the exception can be found in Lee
v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 178 F.2d 750 (2d Cir. 1949). There, Judge Hand
wrote:
The only exception [to the exclusive pleading rule] we can think of is that
the injured party might conceivably recover on a claim which, as he had
alleged it, was outside the policy; but which, as it turned out, the insurer
was bound to pay. Such is the plasticity of modern pleading that no one
can be positive that that could not happen. In such a case of course the
insurer would not have to defend; yet, even then, as soon as, during the
course of the trial, the changed character of the claim appeared, we need
not say that the insured might not insist that the insurer take over the
defence.
Id. at 752-53 (cited with approval by Brohawn v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 276 Md.
396, 408, 347 A.2d 842, 850 (1975)).
263. A. WINDT, supra note 71, § 4.03, at 136-37.
264. For a discussion of the doctrine of reasonable expectations, see Kelso, Idaho and
The Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations: A Springboard for an Analysis of a New
Approach to a Valuable But Often Misunderstood Doctrine, 47 INS. CouNSEL J. 325
(1980).
265. In considering the insured's duty to defend in Brohawn, for example, the court of
appeals stated:
By clear and unequivocal language, Transamerica has assumed the obligation of relieving its insured of the expense of defending an action alleging
and seeking damages within the policy coverage. Additionally, the insured could reasonably expect that the insurer will employ its vast legal
and investigative resources to defeat the action for the mutual benefit of
both the insurer and the insured.
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defend will tum on the manner in which the claimant's attorney drafts a
complaint. 266 The exception to the exclusive pleading rule furthers the
insured's reasonable expectations by focusing on actual facts rather than
on allegations. The insurer, as one court phrased it, "cannot construct a
formal fortress of the [claimant's] pleadings and retreat behind its
walls. " 267
The expectations of the insured are likely to be put at issue in the
first place because the standard policy is silent on the insurer's duty to
defend when allegations indicate noncoverage but the actual facts indicate coverage. 268 This silence cannot be read to obviate the insurer's
duty to defend under such circumstances. 269 If an insurer intends torelieve itself of the obligation to defend when allegations indicate noncoverage, it can make its intent "clear and unmistakable" by drafting a
provision to reflect its intent. 270 The courts have tended to resolve ambiguities in the standard provision in favor of the insured, 271 thus providing

266.
267.

268.
269.
270.

271.

Brohawn, 276 Md. at 409, 347 A.2d at 851.
The doctrine of reasonable expectations, however, is broader than the general
rule of contra proferentem followed in Maryland because it allows a court to honor
the insured's reasonable expectations even when these expectations have been limited by unambiguous language in the policy. The doctrine is closely related to an
adhesion contract analysis. In light of Maryland's long recognition that unambiguous language will be afforded its ordinary and customary meaning even if it creates a
hardship for the insured, Brohawn should not be read as an implicit adoption of the
doctrine of reasonable expectations. Rather, the insured's reasonable expectations
are but one factor to consider in determining the intent of the parties to an insurance
policy.
Comment, The Insurer's Duty, supra note 6, at 738.
Gray v. Zurich Ins. Co., 65 Cal. 2d 263, 276, 419 P.2d 168, 176, 54 Cal. Rptr. 104,
112 (1965); see also Rowell v. Hodges, 434 F.2d 926, 930 (5th Cir. 1970) ("[T]o say
that the [insurer] must gauge its obligation strictly by the pleading called a Complaint, and put blinders on, so to speak, to what it actually knows and has definitely
ascertained, is somewhat archaic, considering the nature of our present system of
notice pleading."); Transport Ins. Co. v. Michigan Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 340 F. Supp.
670, 677 (E.D. Mich. 1972) (An insurer should not be allowed to escape its contractual duty to defend "by ignoring the true facts in reliance upon an ill-founded complaint."). Gray has generated substantial commentary. See, e.g., Note, The
Insurer's Duty to Defend Made Absolute: Gray v. Zurich, 14 UCLA L. REV. 1328
(1967).
See McGettrick v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 264 F.2d 883, 886 (2d Cir. 1959); see
also supra note 1.
Garbett, supra note 6, at 264-65.
In Loftin v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 106 Ga. App. 287, 127 S.E.2d 53 (1962), the
court stated:
If the insurer intended otherwise, it could have made its intent clear and
unmistakable by undertaking to defend 'unless the complaint alleges facts
which show the claimant to be excluded from coverage,' or by using other
unambiguous language, for example: 'The company shall defend claims
and suits, groundless or otherwise, for which it may become liable only
when the allegations thereof show injury covered by the policy and do not
show the claim to be excluded by the policy.'
/d. at 293, 127 S.E.2d at 58.
See A. WINDT, supra note 71, § 4.02.
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further justification for the adoption of a factual exception to the exclusive pleading rule.
The exception's requirement that an insurer defend if it "knows or
should know" of facts indicating a possibility of coverage necessarily requires the insurer to investigate the facts surrounding a claim. 272 From
an insurer's standpoint, the investigation requirement makes sense. The
insurer is not merely concerned with saving litigation expenses; its primary concern is with limiting its exposure under its duty to indemnify. 273
It will best control the cost of indemnification by promptly investigating
claims to determine whether it could be required to indemnify, and if it
could, by entering into the litigation and settlement process. 274 Accordingly, imposition of a duty to investigate on the insurer fulfills the insured's reasonable expectation of a defense for a claim within coverage
and is consistent with Maryland law. 2 7s

B.

Extrinsic Evidence Used to Rebut a Duty to Defend Raised by the
Pleadings

Although extrinsic facts may be admissible under the factual exception to the exclusive pleading rule, an insurer generally cannot use extrinsic facts to determine its duty to defend if the allegations giving rise to
the defense obligation are materially intertwined in the underlying tort
action. 276 Recently, however, Maryland courts have suggested that extrinsic facts can be used by the insurer to determine its duty to defend
under certain limited circumstances. If the pleadings on their face give
rise to a duty to defend based on facts that are not material to the underlying tort action, then the insurer may look to the actual facts, not the
alleged facts, to determine its duty to defend. 277 Similarly, an insurer can
272. See generally Comment, The Insurer's Duty, supra note 6; Note, Liability Insurer's
Duty, supra note 260.
273. Accord A. WINDT, supra note 71, § 4.03.
274. See Comment, The Insurer's Duty, supra note 6, at 749.
275. The Maryland Annotated Code provides that:
(d)The following actions by an insurer ... if committed with such frequency as to indicate a general business practice, are unfair claim settlement practices and are violations of this section ....
(3) Failing to adopt and implement reasonable standards for the
prompt investigation of claims arising under insurance policies;
(4) Refusing to pay claims without conducting a reasonable investigation based on all available information.
Mo. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 230A(d)(3)-(4) (1986).
276. See supra notes 94-114 and accompanying text.
277. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Rairigh, 59 Md. App. 305, 320-21, 475 A.2d 509, 516,
cert. denied, 301 Md. 176, 482 A.2d 502 (1984) (citing Burd v. Sussex Mut. Ins. Co.,
56 N.J. 383, 267 A.2d 7 (1970)). For example, suppose that an insured owns two
cars, a Ford and a Chevy, but only the Ford is covered by his automobile liability
policy. The insured is in an accident while driving the Chevy. The claimant's
pleadings allege that the insured was negligent in the operation of "an automobile."
Under a strict application of the exclusive pleading and potentiality rules, the insurer would have a duty to defend because the ambiguous nature of the pleadings
raises a potentiality of coverage. However, the insurer may look to the actual facts,
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also use extrinsic evidence to determine its duty to defend when the complaint unequivocally shows coverage based on false allegations of a nonmaterial fact. 278
The use of extrinsic evidence to determine a duty to defend often
arises when a driver of an automobile claims insured status as a permissive user under an omnibus clause of an automobile policy. Allegations
that the driver was the agent, servant; or employee of the owner of the
automobile raise the potentiality that the driver was using the automobile
with the owner's permission, thus bringing the driver within the definition of an additional insured under the standard automobile policy. If
the insurer is aware of facts that indicate that the driver was not a permissive user, the insurer is caught in a dilemma. The exclusive pleading
rule demands that the insurer defend the putative insured, but the insurer
knows that it does not have to defend a person who is a stranger to the
contract between it and the named insured. 279
Courts and commentators take different approaches to the problem
of the putative insured. 280 One group allows the insurer to consult extrinsic evidence to determine its duty to defend because the standard
duty-to-defend provision does not obligate the insurer "to defend a comnot the alleged facts, to determine it~ duty to defend, because the identity of the
automobile is not material to the underlying tort action. See Rowell v. Hodges, 434
F.2d 926 (5th Cir. 1970); Burd, 56 N.J. at 388, 267 A.2d at 9; see also Kepner v.
Western Fire Ins. Co., 109 Ariz. 329, 509 P.2d 222 (1973) (insurer could determine
its duty to defend based on actual facts when the complaint gave rise to a duty to
defend but the actual facts showed that the insured was excluded from coverage
under an automobile liability policy because of a business activity exclusion) (cited
by Rairigh, 59 Md. App. at 322, 475 A.2d at 517). See generally A. WINDT, supra
note 71, § 4.04.
278. In the example in the note above, the insurer would still be able to consult extrinsic
evidence to determine its duty to defend even if the complaint had unambiguously
but falsely alleged that the insured was operating the Ford (the covered automobile)
at the time of the accident. An insurer would be prudent to assume the defense
under a reservation of rights but then to institute a declaratory judgment action to ·
determine its duty based on the extrinsic facts. See Atlantic Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v.
Cook, 619 F.2d 553, 554-55 (5th Cir. 1980). The insurer's failure to offer a defense
may constitute a breach of its duty. Cf Colon v. Aetna Life & Casualty Co., 66
N.Y.2d 6, 484 N.E.2d 1040, 494 N.Y.S.2d 688 (1985) (false allegation that driver
was a permissive user of the insured owner's automobile gave rise to a duty to defend and subjected the breaching insurer to damages).
279. One commentator argues that the insurer should be allowed to consult extrinsic
evidence to determine whether its duty to defend exists. While the pleadings may
give rise to a duty to defend, the insurer has to defend allegations only if it has an
actual duty to defend. The relationship of insurer and insured is a prerequisite to
the insurer's obligations to defend and indemnify. Allowing the drafter of the
claimant's pleadings to create the insurer-insured relationship would lead to absurd
results. The driver is not an insured unless and until he can prove, as a matter of
fact, that he qualifies as an additional insured. See A. WINDT, supra note 71, § 4.05,
at 144-47 .
. 280. See Navajo Freight Lines v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 12 Ariz.App. 424,471 P.2d 309
(1970); Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Jones, 397 So. 2d 317 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981);
A. WINDT, supra note 71, at§ 4.05.
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plete stranger to the contract." 281 The other group holds the insurer responsible for providing a defense to the putative insured but permits the
insurer to bring a declaratory judgment action to determine its defense
obligation. 282
In Maryland, although no court has addressed the issue directly, it
appears that an insurer would be allowed to consult extrinsic evidence to
determine whether it owed a duty to defend the putative insured, because
the issue of whether the driver was a permissive user is not material to
the underlying tort action. 283 Nevertheless, a prudent insurer should assume the defense under a reservation of rights and institute a declaratory
judgment action to determine its defense duty, especially where there is a
factual dispute over whether the driver had permission to use the insured
owner's vehicle. 284 Declaratory judgment is appropriate in these cases
because the issue of permissive use is not material to the issue of either
the driver's or the owner's tort liability. 285
C.

The Duty to Defend and the Tort of Bad Faith

In Maryland, an insurer is obligated to act fairly and in good faith in
settling third-party liability claims within the policy limits. 286 This obligation of fair dealing and good faith is a fiduciary duty that arises out of
the insurer's exclusive control of the investigation, settlement and defense
of the claim against its insured. 287 The insurer's exclusive control over
the litigation creates an actual or potential conflict of interest between
insurer and insured. 288 The insured wants to protect his personal assets
by settling the case within the policy limits. The prospect of an award in
excess of the insured's policy limits does not threaten the insurer, how281. A. WINDT, supra note 71, § 4.05, at 144.
282. See Colon v. Aetna Life & Casualty Co., 66 N.Y.2d 6, 484 N.E.2d 1040, 494
N.Y.S.2d 688 (1985); American Home Assurance Co. v. Czarnecki, 255 La. 251,
230 So. 2d 253 (1970); Lumbermen's Mut. Casualty Co. v. Rollings, 355 So. 2d 1041
(La. Ct. App. 1978).
283. Cf Burd v. Sussex Mut. Ins. Co., 56 N.J. 383, 267 A.2d 7 (1970) (cited with approval in Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Rairigh, 59 Md. App 305, 317, 475 A.2d 509,
516, cert. denied, 301 Md. 176, 482 A.2d 502 (1984)).
284. In the likely event that the claimant sues both the driver and the insured owner, the
insurer would have an obligation to defend both. The insurer would also have to
offer the driver his Brohawn choice of counsel. It would be best, however, if the
insurer engaged separate counsel to represent the driver and the owner. The
owner's attorney would move quickly to rebut the presumption of agency and, if
possible, would seek summary judgment. At the same time, the insurer could institute a declaratory judgment action to determine whether the driver was using the
automobile with the owner's permission.
285. McCarty v. Parks, 564 P.2d 1122 (Utah 1977). But see Murphy v. Urso, 88 Ill.2d
444,430 N.E.2d 1079 (1981) (issue of permissive use so intertwined with concept of
agency that declaratory judgment was not appropriate).
286. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. White, 248 Md. 324, 236 A.2d 269 (1967);
Sweeten v. National Mut. Ins. Co., 233 Md. 52, 194 A.2d 817 (1963).
287. Sweeten, 233 Md. at 55, 194 A.2d at 818.
288. /d. This conflict of interest, however, does not give rise to a Brohawn choice of
independent counsel because the conflict does not involve the conduct of the case.
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ever, so the insurer is less motivated to settle the claim within policy
limits. 289
The duty to act fairly and in good faith requires the insurer to give
equal weight to its own interests and those of the insured. 290 The insurer
must act honestly, exercise reasonable care, diligently investigate and appraise the case, and keep its insured reasonably well-informed of the progress of the case, including settlement offers. 291 Although the good faith
standard requires the insurer to act honestly and diligently, it does not
impose liaqility upon the insurer for simple negligence. 292 Serious and
recurrent negligence, however, may be evidence of bad faith. 293 Many
factors may affect whether an insurer's decision not to settle was an honest and informed one that took the insured's interests into account. 294 If
an insurer acts in bad faith by not settling a third-party claim within
policy limits, then it is liable for any verdict in excess of the policy
limits. 295
Maryland courts have limited the scope of the tort of bad faith to
the insurer's duty to settle and have expressly refused to expand the tort
to situations involving an insurer's bad faith failure to pay an insurance
claim. 296 The Maryland courts, however, have not decided whether the
289. Johnson v. Federal Kemper Ins. Co., 74 Md. App. 243, 247, 536 A.2d 1211, 1213,
cert. denied, 313 Md. 8, 542 A.2d 844 (1988).
290. Sobus v. Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co., 393 F. Supp. 661 (D. Md. 1975) (applying
Maryland law). The concept of "good faith" is a "highly elusive one." /d. at 672.
291. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. White, 248 Md. 324, 332, 236 A.2d 269, 273
(1967).
292. Sobus, 393 F. Supp. at 673. An insurer also has a separate tort duty to "conduct the
actual defense of the insured with reasonable care .... " /d. at 671. Among other
things, this duty requires the insurer to conduct an adequate investigation. If the
insurer breaches its duty of reasonable care in preparing and conducting the defense,
then it "is liable for a verdict adverse to its insured in excess of the policy limits,
which is caused by the insurer's negligence." /d. See generally 1A R. LONG & M.
RHODES, supra note 67, § 5.26; A. W~NDT, supra note 71, § 4.38.
293. Sobus, 393 F. Supp. at 673.
294. Among the factors that a court will consider in determining whether an insurer
breached its obligation to use good faith in settling a claim within its insured's policy limits are:
[T]he severity of the plaintiff's injuries giving rise to the likelihood of a
verdict greatly in excess of the policy limits; lack of proper and adequate
investigation of the circumstances surrounding the accident; ... failure of
the insurer to inform the insured of a compromise offer within or near the
policy limits; pressure by the insurer on the insured to make a contribution
towards a compromise settlement within the policy limits, as an inducement to settlement by the insurer; and actions which demonstrate a
greater concern for the insurer's monetary interests than the financial risk
attendant to the insured's predicament.
White, 248 Md. at 332, 236 A.2d at 273. A " 'mere mistake of judgment' " will not
impose liability on the insurer. Sobus, 393 F. Supp. at 673 (quoting American Casualty Co. v. Howard, 187 F.2d 322, 329 (4th Cir. 1951)). The issue of whether the
insurer acted in good faith is a factual one. Schlossberg v. Epstein, 73 Md. App.
415, 436, 534 A.2d 1003, 1014 (1988).
295. See, e.g., White, 248 Md. at 330-31, 236 A.2d at 272.
296. Johnson v. Federal Kemper Ins. Co., 74 Md. App. 243, 246, 536 A.2d 1211, 1212,
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tort should be extended to the duty to defend. 297 While there are arguments to the contrary, 298 the extension seems both logical and inevitable,
especially in light of the related obligations of reasonable care and good
faith imposed on the insurer. 2 99
Several jurisdictions have recognized that a bad faith refusal to defend may constitute a breach of the insurer's duty of fair dealing and
good faith. 300 In such jurisdictions, the mere refusal to defend does not
in itself constitute bad faith. While the insured need not show that the
insurer acted with malice, oppression, or fraud, he must show more than
the mere breach of the contractual duty to defend. 301 An insurer's failure to conduct an investigation into its duty to defend, coupled with its
failure to consider the opinions of its own staff regarding its duty to defend, has been held to constitute sufficient proof of bad faith. 302 But if
the insurer has reasonable grounds for refusing to defend its insured,
then no tort liability will attach. 303
The extension of the tort of bad faith to the duty to defend opens the
door to the recovery of damages beyond those available in traditional
breach of contract suits. In a breach of contract action based on an insurer's refusal to defend, the insured is entitled to reasonable attorney's
fees and expenses incurred in the underlying tort suit and in any declaratory judgment action brought against the insurer to determine covercert. denied, 313 Md. 8, 542 A.2d 844 (1988); Caruso v. Republic Ins. Co., 558 F.
Supp. 430 (D. Md. 1983) (applying Maryland law).
297. In Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Rairigh, 59 Md. App. 305, 317, 475 A.2d 509, 51415, cert. denied, 301 Md. 176, 482 A.2d 502 (1984), however, the trial court assumed that the tort of bad faith did exist and even awarded the insured punitive
damages. On appeal, the court did not address the validity of a bad faith claim
based on an insurer's refusal to defend its insured. But see Dickson v. Selected
Risks Ins. Co., 666 F. Supp. 80, 81 (D. Md. 1987) (applying Maryland law) (excess
insurer's refusal to defend does npt give rise to a claim based on "bad faith;" rather
the insurer's breach is "fully remedial by a conract action.").
298. The duty to act in good faith is inherent in every contract. Caruso, 558 F. Supp.
430; Johnson, 74 Md. App. 243, 536 A.2d 1211. The tort of bad faith arises from
breach of the fiduciary duty owed to the insured by the insurer because the insurer's
total control of the case creates a potential conflict of interest. See supra text accompanying notes 287-289. But there is no need to impose a separate tort duty on
the insurer to act in good faith in honoring its duty to defend, because there is no
potential for a conflict of interest to arise. In other words, there is no fiduciary duty
owed because the fiduciary duty is not undertaken. See Farris v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 284 Or. 453, 587 P.2d lOIS (1978).
299. Indeed, one commentator has even stated that "there appears no valid reason why a
liability insurer that refuses in bad faith to defend its insured against a third-party
action should not also be subject to tort liability for breach of the implied covenant
of good faith and fair dealing." M. SHERNOFF, S. GAGE, & H. LEVINE, INSURANCE
BAD FAITH LITIGATION§ 3.25[1) (1987) [hereinafter M. SHERNOFF).
300. /d.
301. /d. ("To recover on a tort theory for breach of the implied covenant of good faith, it
appears that the insured must establish more than a breach of the contractual duty
to defend.").
302. See Tibbs v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 755 F.2d 1370, 1375 (9th Cir. 1985).
303. See American Excess Ins. Co. v. M.G.M. Grand Hotels, Inc., 729 P.2d 1352, 1354SS (Nev. 1986); Calenda \/. Allstate Ins. Co., 518 A.2d 624, 629 (R.I. 1986).
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age. 304 In those jurisdictions that recognize the tort of bad faith in the
duty to defend context, an insured is entitled to recover damages for
emotional distress, and under certain circumstances, punitive damages,
in addition to the amount of any judgment in excess of his policy limits. 305 If Maryland courts were to extend the tort of bad faith to the duty
to defend, it is likely that both damages for emotional distress 306 and,
upon a showing of actual malice, punitive damages 307 could be
recovered.
VIII.

CONCLUSION

In Maryland, the standard liability policy requires the insurer to defend the insured against any suit alleging a claim that falls within the
scope of the policy's coverage. In addition, the insurer is required to
defend the insured against any suit alleging a claim that does not fall
clearly within the scope of the policy's coverage if there is a potential that
the claim may be covered. The insurer's obligation to defend claims that
raise a potential duty to indemnify gives the insured the litigation protection he purchased and is one of the most important benefits in the standard liability policy.
In recent years, Maryland courts have broadened the insurer's obligations to a point where the insurer has a near-absolute duty to defend
whenever its insured is sued. An insurer is obligated to defend its insured
unless it can be concluded as a matter of law that no factual or legal basis
exists on which the insurer may be held liable under its duty to
indemnify.
The imposition of a near-absolute duty to defend has several consequences: it places the burden on the insurer to bring a declaratory judgment action to determine its obligation if the insurer disputes such an
obligation, it fulfills the insured's reasonable expectations and it protects
the insured from the insurer's mistakes of judgment in evaluating its duty
to defend. The basic rule has been expanded in some jurisdictions by
applying the tort of bad faith to the insurer's duty to defend and by imposing a defense duty under the factual exception to the exclusive pleading rule. Although these extensions of the duty have not yet been
304. See supra notes 119-123 and accompanying text.
305. See generally A. WINDT, supra note 71, § 4.34, at 210-11; M. SHERNOFF, supra note
299, § 3.26[2]; Annotation, Insurer's Tort Liability for Consequential or Punitive
Damages for Wrongful Failure or Refusal to Defend Insured, 20 A.L.R.4TH 23
(1984).
306. For a general consideration of damages for emotional distress, see Annotation,
Emotional or Mental Distress as Element of Damages for Liability Insurer's Wrongful Refusal to Settle, 57 A.L.R.4TH 801 (1988).
307. See H. & R. Block, Inc. v. Testerman, 275 Md. 36, 338 A.2d 48 (1974) (punitive
damages awarded in torts arising out of a breach of contract upon a showing of
actual malice); cf Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Rairigh, 59 Md. App. 305, 311-12,
475 A.2d 509, 512, cert. denied, 301 Md. 176, 482 A.2d 502 (1984) (trial court
granted punitive damages for a bad faith refusal to defend, but the appellate court
did not address either the availability or the standard for awarding such damages).
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adopted in Maryland, they further the reasonable expectations of the insured and comport with Maryland public policy. The burden of the insurer's duty to defend is heavy, but it is a burden the insurer, as the
drafter of the policy, has chosen to bear.

